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Dingman argues that the San Francisco settlement signaled the emergence of 
a new Pacific maritime order in which the United States Navy is the dominant 
naval force relying on significant bases in Japan. In particular, he focuses on 
the Yokosuka naval base whose retention was called for by the navy and 
became an important element in Washington’s approach to the peace 
negotiations. 
 
Tozawa deals with the attitudes of the Yoshida government and the opposition 
parties to the peace negotiations and later to the ratification of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States-Japan Security Pact. The 
points of difference were: whether Japan should negotiate with all the victors 
or with individual countries; whether Japan should observe disarmed 
neutrality; whether amendment to the Constitution was necessary. 
 
Cortazzi presents the perspective of a junior official in the United Kingdom 
Liaison Mission from October 1951. He gives an account of the activities of 
the British delegation to the San Francisco Conference and the conversations 
of Herbert Morrison and Robert Scott, especially with Prime Minister Yoshida. 
 
Lowe argues that British ministers and officials looked backward, influenced 
by economic, strategic and public opinion factors, the last referring to 
prisoners-of-war who had been treated harshly in Southeast Asia. The Labour 
government was worried over a probable revival in Japanese economic 
competition, referring particularly to textiles, shipping and the potteries. The 
British views of the treaty were much more critical of Japan than the USA. 
Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, anxious that the British contribution to 
the ultimate treaty should be properly acknowledged, agreed to be in San 
Francisco at the last moment for the signing of the peace treaty. 
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Robert Scott; John Foster Dulles; Yoshida Shigeru; USA; Japan; United 
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delegation to the San Francisco Peace Conference; Ratification; new Pacific 




ANCHOR FOR PEACE: 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE SHAPING OF 





I. Anchor for Peace 
The city of San Francisco, where the peace and security treaties that constitute the 
Japanese peace settlement of 1951 were signed, is surrounded on three sides by 
water. One can smell the salt air of the bay from the War Memorial Opera House, site of 
the peace conference; and the Presidio, where signatures were put to the United States 
– Japan Security Treaty, perches on a neck of land that anchors the Golden Gate 
Bridge. The closeness to the sea of the ceremonies that concluded these agreements 
fifty years ago was entirely appropriate, for that proximity reminds us of an essential but 
often overlooked characteristic of the Japanese peace settlement. The peace that was 
signed at San Francisco in September 1951 marked much more than the end of a state 
of war with Japan. It signaled the emergence of a new Pacific maritime order.  
 
That new order differed from those of the past in that one power, the United States of 
America, became the dominant naval force in the Pacific. The United States Navy 
commanded the waters of the world’s largest ocean as no other nation had ever done. 
That pre-eminence was achieved by defeating Imperial Japan, the dominant regional 
naval power before the war; by relegating allies, in that great conflict and in the Korean 
War, to distinctly secondary naval status; and, most importantly, by securing bases 
along the Asia/Pacific littoral. The most significant of those bases were in Japan.  
 
Today, fifty years after their retention was confirmed in the Japanese peace settlement, 
those bases on the Japanese home islands and on Okinawa, remain the anchor for 
peace in the Pacific. Today, the men and women of United States Navy and Marine 
Corps in Japan constitute the preponderant element of the largest American military 
force in any Asian nation.  And today the American naval presence in Japan remains an 
essential element in Japan’s defense and a vital, living symbol of the American 
commitment to alliance with Japan – the alliance that was signed at San Francisco in 





That alliance and the American military/naval presence that sustains it has often been 
the subject of public debate and scholarly controversy over the past half century. Yet 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to its origins – its naval origins. In this essay I 
seek to remedy that deficiency. The story of how the United States Navy came to 
acquire bases and permanent presence in Japan is worth telling in its own right. But the 
tale is also valuable for what it reveals about the processes of peacemaking that 
culminated in the agreements concluded at San Francisco fifty years ago. 
 
In this essay, I propose to address the questions of how and why the United States 
acquired, and the Japanese government accepted, naval bases in Japan by focusing on 
the largest and most important naval base – Yokosuka. Its history from 1945 through 
1951 demonstrates, I will argue, several important points about the peace-making 
process that culminated in the signature of peace and security treaties at San Francisco 
in 1951.  
 
That process began on the individual level, broadened to the Yokosuka community, and 
set the stage for the commencement of formal peace negotiations. The U.S. Navy 
played a key role in shaping an American policy that looked toward retention of the base 
after conclusion of a peace treaty. The political and diplomatic decisions that affirmed 
that position were taken, I will argue, voluntarily on both sides; Washington did not force 
base retention upon Tokyo as a condition for peace. Those choices, as I will 
demonstrate, were made before the outbreak of the war in Korea confirmed the wisdom, 
from both American and Japanese points of view, of making forward basing of U.S. 
Naval forces in Japan the cardinal element of a new Asian/Pacific maritime order.  
 
II. Uneasy Beginnings,  August 1945- March 1946 
 
The starting point for understanding the peace process that culminated at San 
Francisco is the hostility between Japan and its enemies during the Pacific War. 
For forty-four months the fighting forces and civilian populations of Japan,  America, and 
its allies were bombarded by government propaganda that made them see the enemy 
as a vicious, less than human ‘other’.
1 The final months of the war, marked for 
Americans by casualties on an unprecedented scale at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and for  
 
 
Japanese by preparations for a defense to the death of their homeland and the horrors 
of fire- and atomic- bombing, made it extremely unlikely that people from the two 
countries would find it possible to live together in peace.  
 
Thus preparations for the landing of American and British forces at Yokosuka, a city of 
two hundred thousand located twenty-two miles southwest of Tokyo that was home to 
the Imperial Japanese navy’s largest base, were marked by apprehension on both 
sides.
2 American senior officers insisted upon wartime ‘darkened ship’ conditions when 
they first approached the coast near Yokosuka and planned for full scale combat-style 
landings.
3 They had cobbled together a force of just under nine thousand men that 
would be going ashore in an area known to contain a quarter million armed Japanese. It 
was, as the task force’s chief of staff put it, ‘a very alarming prospect’.
4 
 
For Yokosuka Imperial Japanese Navy and local civilian officials, what loomed ahead 
was both alarming and humiliating. Defeat was about to become real in the persons of 
an invading army. To minimize trouble, the Yokosuka base commander, Vice Admiral 
Totsuka Michitoru, sent staff members to the USS San Diego, flagship of Admiral 
William F. ‘Bull’ Halsey, the invasion force commander, to get precise information about 
how the surrender would proceed and what the Americans and their allies required.
5 
They were received in a ‘strictly cold and formal’ manner designed to impress upon 




Ashore, a Yokosuka Liaison Committee was formed to identify and deal with anticipated 
problems, and two hundred extra police and five senior police officials were rushed in to 
preserve order. Fearing rape, local officials negotiated with the associations that had 
provided ‘comfort facilities’ to Imperial Japanese Navy personnel to meet the sexual 
needs of the invaders. Reluctantly, some four hundred twenty-eight women agreed to 
do so. On the eve of the landings, Yokosuka’s mayor and the chairman of the Liaison 
Committee issued strict orders for citizens – especially women and children - to stay in 







Thus when elements of the 4
th Marine Regimental Combat Team, a U.S. Navy landing 
party, and a small British landing force came ashore on the morning of August 30, 1945, 
they were met by an eerie silence.
8 Only a few sentries at major buildings on the naval 
base remained; and the marines treated them roughly, tearing up carefully prepared 
property inventories.
9 The landing party camped out in base buildings
10 as if they were 
on the beach of some South Pacific island, uncertain as to what might follow. Their 
commanders warily sent patrols into the city; checked out its water supply for fear of 
poisoning; and heaved sighs of relief that no casualties had occurred.
11 Still cautious, 
they refused to give their men liberty to go into Yokosuka for several days thereafter. 
12 
 
Indeed, frostiness at the higher command level was the norm for the first ninety days of 
the occupation of Yokosuka.  Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, the invasion force and first 
base commander, and Brigadier General William T. Clement, the marine commander, 
remained ‘Jap haters’.
13 When Admiral William F. ‘Bull’ Halsey, commander of the third 
fleet that brought the invaders to Japan, visited Imperial Japanese Navy officers’ 
quarters on the Yokosuka base that his subordinates had appropriated, he took one 
look at the tatami flooring and spat on it saying, ‘living like rats’.
14 Even Admiral Chester 
W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, had his doubts about what was going on at 
Yokosuka. When he visited the city and its environs following the surrender ceremonies 
aboard the USS Missouri, he was struck by the Japanese people’s apparent 
indifference to the Americans’ presence. ‘Most [Japanese] people’, he noted, ‘acted as if 
we did not exist’.
15 
 
Captain O.O. ‘Scrappy’ Kessing, a hardened submariner who commanded the 
Yokosuka base from September through November 1945, wanted to preserve the 
distance between Americans and Japanese.
16  He had no respect for the former enemy, 
and he did nothing to keep skylarking sailors from covering the half-sunken battleship 
Nagato in Yokosuka Harbor with graffiti.
17 Kessing was willing to let Navy Japanese 
language officers negotiate prices for his men’s visits to geisha houses but opposed 
fraternization beyond that. Carefully controlled tours to see the ruins of Tokyo were all 
right, but contact with Japanese was not, in his view, supposed to lead to friendship. 
Kessing went so far as to have posters depicting an anguished prisoner of war and 
captioned ‘Remember what they did to him when you think of getting friendly with a  
 
 
Jap!’  put up around the base. He even called in Yokosuka’s mayor and chief of police 




But Kessing and other senior officers could no more control the human interaction that 
developed in Yokosuka than King Canute could command the waves. Americans were 
curious about the defeated foe and prepared to give him - or her - a close look.  What 
intelligence officials told them in a one hundred page book circulated to the fleet at the 
time of the surrender was tantalizing. The Japanese were not always at war, and in 
peace ‘they are among the world’s most delightful people’. Although they were 
‘extremely courteous…selective imitators’, they had ‘courage and determination’ [and 
the ability to] ‘endure hardship and suffering for a long time without outcry’.
19 The 
invaders wanted souvenirs, both tangible and experiential, and very quickly shopping 
and sex became major leisure pastimes.  
 
Yokosuka Japanese were willing to meet their needs, for they recognized that doing so 
was one means of getting enough income to feed their families. The American who 
passed through the base gate into the city was greeted by a huge taxi advertisement 
that said, ‘Hello, Sir. Please Ride Cheerfully Around Yokosuka With Us’.
20 Other more 
imaginative businesswomen flashed ‘Girls, girls!’ in morse code to lonesome bachelor 
officers on the base. What followed was ‘like a salmon run’. Some men rowed across 
the channel; others swam towing their clothes in a water-tight container; and still others 
commandeered a jeep to drive to Yokosuka’s Yoshiwara district. An evening of drinking, 
singing, and mutual discovery followed.
21 A mutually profitable barter trade for 
souvenirs, with cigarettes, chocolate, and sugar as currency, also flourished – so much 
so that base officials began searching men departing on liberty so as to keep them from 
worsening inflation and black markets in Yokosuka.
22  
 
Such unofficial and mutually beneficial interaction between the invaders and their hosts 
amazed many observers. They struggled to explain how people who yesterday had 
been bitter enemies could today relate to one another so pleasantly. Some explained 
this phenomenon as a byproduct of war weariness; sailors and marines happy to have 
survived recent battles were simply full of joi de vivre.




more sophisticated. In Yokosuka, for example, American interpreters were entertained 
by the chief of police, the boss of local fish markets, the family of a dancer who 
performed on the base, and, eventually, the mayor – who turned out to have been a 
Japanese commissioner to the New York World’s Fair of 1939.  They became victims of 
the Japanese culture of gift-giving, acquiring swords and kimono as souvenirs and 
providing chocolate and cigarettes as token repayment. But they recognized this 
controlled social interaction for what it was: a means of making them feel better about 
the Japanese with whom they interacted on a daily basis.
24  
 
Indeed, one can see in their socializing no less than in the countless exchanges of grins 
and gum or candy between Japanese children and the American occupiers of Yokosuka 
an important beginning to the peace-making process.  In these encounters, Japanese 
and Americans began to see one another as individuals – not as an alien “other” or “the 
enemy.”  As one navy lieutenant, junior grade – who chose to move off the base with 
several of his mates to live in a Japanese house in the city – put it: 
 
‘Should I feel that because I am civil to the old women and children I meet am 
betraying the men who died on Iwo Jima and Bataan? My first contact with the 
Japanese has presented them to me as a fawning, polite, and essentially stupid 
people. I cannot hate them. I can but treat them as individuals.’ 
 
The lieutenant admitted that he might have been ‘easily deceived and tricked by a 
deliberately planned hypocrisy’. But in time he, and others like him, would develop 
through their participation in heart-wrenching scenes such as the repatriation at nearby 
Uraga of Japanese soldiers stranded for years on ‘by-passed’ South Pacific islands or a 
New Years’ feast at the home of their house boy, an empathy for the Japanese people 




But that empathy was, as yet, too shallow to serve as the foundation for peace in the 
longer term.  Americans and Japanese in Yokosuka during the first six months after the 
surrender sensed that their relationships were temporary, perhaps even ephemeral.   
The invaders, whether combat-hardened sailors and marines or language officers who 
had spent most of the war in school or in intelligence work at Pearl Harbor, were more 




charms of the Japanese people and the beauty of their country. They knew their time in 
Yokosuka was nothing more than a pleasant interlude.  
 
So, too, did their hosts, one of whom composed and printed in the local newspaper a 
parting song supposedly sung by a departing American officer:  
 
        ‘Goodbye, Yokosuka – my beloved town; 
       The day she stood and watched my jeep run by 
       In cute kimono of a long-sleeved gown, 
       Renders me the memory of her charming eye. 
 
       Good-bye, Yokosuka, Mt. Fuji, cherry, and all— 
       With all my G.I’s off my soul, 
       I’ll be longing to see you once again 
       In good old civvies in which I’ll for’er remain.’
26 
 
What the Yokosuka songwriter wrote anticipated only slightly what Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign officials thought when they composed their first studies on a possible peace 
treaty in the late winter and spring of 1946.  One, written before the promulgation of a 
new national constitution that abjured the use of force to settle international disputes, 
looked to the reconstitution of a Japanese army and navy to defend the nation.  A 
second supposed that the famous Article Nine of the new constitution meant that Japan 
must rely upon the United Nations or some other form of international guarantee to 
protect its security.
27  Neither imagined that the American naval presence at Yokosuka 
could or would become a permanent element in the preservation of that security. 
 
III.Towards Coexistence and Cooperation, 1946-1949 
In April 1946, just as the cherry blossoms burst into bloom, however, the American 
naval presence in Yokosuka showed its first sign of permanence in the person of a new 
base commander, Captain Benton Weaver Decker. ‘Benny’ Decker had visited Japan, 
but not the virtually closed city of Yokosuka, in April 1939 when the USS Astoria 
returned the ashes of former ambassador Saito Hiroshi to his homeland.
28  He brought 
a mix of wartime experiences with him – sea duty on both a battleship and landing craft 
in the South Pacific; command of a training base in Florida; and Washington duty that 
included membership on the Joint Civil Affairs Committee.
29 But his sense of the 




more important for the future.  At his very first meeting with his staff, Decker instructed 




That idea, although then only Decker’s personal view and not official U.S. Navy policy, 
lay at the heart of his approach to his job. The ambitious and energetic captain, unlike 
his predecessors, realized that there was a symbiotic relationship between the base and 
the city of Yokosuka and its people.  One could not thrive if the other suffered. To that 
end, he began, within a month of his arrival, distributing surplus food to local Japanese 
who were facing severe food shortages.
31 He had the wall that had hidden the base 
from ordinary citizens’ view torn down.
32 Then, with the aid of his wife, Edwina Naylor 
Decker, he set out to change both the base and the city so as to make their peaceful 
coexistence possible. Decker wanted both to become examples of clean and modern 
multi-cultural democracy. 
 
Changing the base from its dilapidated, war-worn state could be done fairly easily. 
Decker ordered his subordinates to ‘clean it up!’  When his wife, Edwina, arrived, she 
joined him in trying to create a small town community atmosphere on it, complete with 
clubs and chapel, park areas and recreation facilities. Decker built a gymnasium and 
championed athletic competitions of all sorts. A base theater showed recent movies.
33 
The Japanese government built 193 new family homes and 96 apartments for base 
residents.
34  And, to lessen the likelihood that young sailors or marines would engage in 
socially deviant behavior once they left this replica of home, Decker poured funds into a 
resplendent Enlisted Men’s Club just beyond the base gates. It hired top Japanese 




Changing Yokosuka, however, was a far more complex task. Despite his prewar visits 
to China and Japan, Decker was not cross-culturally sensitive. Ambitious for success 
(and the two stars of a rear admiral), he was used to issuing orders and having them 
obeyed.
36 He wanted to get things done in a hurry, and within one hundred days of his 
arrival he had developed a list of nearly three hundred ‘projects’ for change in Yokosuka 
that he wanted completed as quickly as possible. These actions ranged from controlling  
 
 
typhus and venereal diseases to changing the city government, renovating schools, and 
finding employment for former senior Imperial Japanese Navy officers.
37  
 
Decker, with the assistance of his wife, Edwina, developed a three-pronged strategy for 
achieving such changes. At one level, it mimicked General Douglas MacArthur’s mode 
of acting through Japanese government officials. Decker brought in the mayor, a 
wartime appointee who had cooperated fully with the Imperial Navy, and later the 
chairman of the city council, and told them what he wanted done. Reforming the police 
was first on his list.
38  At another level, Decker’s strategy mobilized Japanese citizen 
constituencies for change. The Deckers strongly supported a reorganized and 
independent local Women’s Club that worked to improve social conditions by 
distributing food, staffing orphanages, and pressing their more conservative spouses for 
better schools and more democracy.
39 The captain championed industrialization of 
former base areas and the establishment of a local chamber of commerce to promote 
trade.
40 And at a third level, Decker promoted change by trying to penetrate Japanese 
society with American voluntary associations. He provided surplus land and facilities to 
Catholic and Protestant missionaries; helped fund the establishment of YMCA, YWCA, 
and Red Cross organizations; and championed the Boy and Girl Scout movements as 
well as Freemasonry.
41 If these non-governmental agencies succeeded in making 
Yokosuka Japanese just a bit more like Americans living on the base – with just a 
modicum of official support from him – then Decker would achieve ‘democratization’ 
consistent with broad Occupation policy and conducive to peaceful coexistence of 
Americans and Japanese.  
 
The Navy captain’s ambitious program for change would have failed, however, had he 
not had vital assistance from two sources. One came from dedicated subordinates who 
were far more flexible and cross-culturally sensitive than he. Commander Wallace L. 
Higgins, technically the allied military governor of Kanagawa Prefecture but in fact 
Decker’s executive officer in Yokosuka, stood first among them.
42 He had headed the 
first American military government team at Kure, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Inland 
Sea base, from October 1945 through January 1946. What he experienced there 
changed him from indifferently successful salesman turned naval reserve civil affairs 




discovered that one must listen and learn from the Japanese if he was to gain more 
than minimal, sullen cooperation. He learned to party with them and fell in love with his 
Japanese housekeeper. With her help, he improved his Japanese language and social 
skills so as to maneuver local officials and businessmen into doing what he wanted. By 
the time Decker brought him to Yokosuka in August 1946, Higgins knew that patience, 
indirection, and sensitivity to a person’s status within the group were vital keys to getting 
things done in Japan.
43  
 
Higgins was prepared, in ways the Decker was not, to cooperate with local community 
leaders to secure their cooperation in changing Yokosuka for the better and their 
acceptance of the U.S. Navy’s continuing presence in their city. The Deckers occupied  
(and painted in proper New England white), the Tadodai residence of the local Imperial 
Japanese Navy commander.
44 Higgins and his Japanese wife-to-be set up 
housekeeping in a beautiful house at Otsu, located for them by one of the Japanese 
Navy interpreters.
45 He had no qualms about the fact that the principal local employer, 
the Uraga Dock Company, paid for its maintenance.
46  There he wined, dined, and sang 
songs with local officials and businessmen so often and so openly that Decker forbade 
other junior officers to join them. Higgins, nevertheless, continued this informal 
socializing as a way of gaining information about what was going on at the upper 




Higgins and Decker both would have failed miserably, however, if they had not had the 
acquiescence and/or approbation of Japanese officials. In January 1946 Uchiyama 
Kantaro, a former diplomat and friend of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, was named 
governor of Kanagawa, the prefecture in which Yokosuka was located. Uchiyama, 
unlike his predecessor and Home Ministry officials who served elsewhere as governors, 
took a positive attitude toward the presence of occupation forces in Japan.
48 While he 
undoubtedly wanted the Eighth Army out of the center of bomb-ruined Yokohama, he 
recognized that good things could come from a new international leaven in Japanese 
society.  Uchiyama established a sub-unit within his administration to act as liaison with 
the foreigners. He sometimes found the ebullient Decker’s methods difficult to 




non-governmental agencies. The governor also became friendly with Higgins and other 




Officials sent from Tokyo to help manage civil-naval relations in the city also greatly 
aided Decker. In 1946 the local branch of the Central Liaison Office, an agency that 
brought diplomats and Home Ministry officials together to deal with the American 
occupiers, assumed responsibility for labor procurement, ending a corrupt process of 
hiring through local private labor brokers who skimmed off large portions of base 
workers’ salaries.
50 These Japanese officials also acquiesced when the base 
commander, in response to protests from church and women’s groups back home, 
demanded closure of the special ‘comfort facilities’ for foreigners in the city’s pleasure 
quarter.
51  Indeed, one of their number, Ota Saburo, stepped in to halt a bitter behind-
the-scenes struggle between the Navy and city hall during the first election campaign for 
mayor in April 1947. He won the contest, and for the next two years put his diplomat’s 




Thus there developed between the base and the city a mutually profitable and tolerant 
coexistence that none could have imagined during the first, anxious postwar days. 
Yokosuka was not the perfect base host city that ‘Benny’ Decker dreamed it might 
become. A substantial leftist opposition to the Navy’s presence developed. It was 
driven, in part, by communists and fanned by the base commander’s vigorous and not 
always wise application of anti-communist labor and demonstration control measures.
53 
But at the same time, an increasing number of Japanese and Americans worked side by 
side on the base. By 1948 three thousand men in navy and marine corps uniforms lived 
and worked there, 
54and new and returning residents pushed the city’s population back 
up to nearly ninety percent of its wartime high.
55 One in four Japanese residents in 
Yokosuka owed their livelihood, directly or indirectly, to the American presence.
56 
 
Americans and Japanese also learned to celebrate together and to live with their 
differences. Decker saw to it that Japanese as well as American holidays were 




American teams. The base was opened to ordinary Japanese who were given treasured 
bottles of Coca Cola as a remembrance of the occasion.
57 Nevertheless, city officials 
continued to dream of and plan for the day when they would recover full control of the 
harbor area. They stopped trying to get U.S. Navy officials to subsidize their budget as 
the Imperial Japanese Navy had done and turned to the national government (in 
conjunction with other former navy base cities) to establish procedures for the eventual 
return of former Japanese navy facilities. Eventually the Diet approved such legislation, 




In the meantime, Americans and Japanese found ways to manage their differences, 
even in the difficult area of sexual relations. Licensed and free-lance ‘pan-pan’ 
prostitutes did not vanish from the city’s pleasure quarter, as American matrons on the 
base and Japanese social reformers might have desired. But base officials and the local 
women’s club worked to try to lower the venereal disease rate in the city.
59  Female 
Japanese base workers successfully resisted, however, humiliating American demands 
for venereal disease checks as a condition of employment.
60 Occasionally American 
men raped Japanese women; but perpetrators were court martialed and quickly shipped 
back to the United States.
61 In time, base and city officials agreed on a system of health 
inspections for sex workers and the establishment of a clinic for sexually transmitted 
diseases in one of the city’s hospitals.  Those measures helped preserve the health of 
Japanese and Americans alike.
62  
 
‘Benny’ Decker was not one to let what had been achieved at Yokosuka under his 
leadership go unnoticed. During the first three years of his tenure as base commander, 
he worked hard to let his military superiors, visiting dignitaries from the United States, 
the press, and important Japanese know what was going on there. He tried and failed to 
get Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to stop during a brief visit early in 1946; 
undaunted, he went on to court the assistant secretary and members of the House 
Naval Affairs Committee before the year ended. When the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Louis Denfeld visited Yokosuka in April1947, he was impressed and agreed 
with Decker’s expressed hope that ‘the United States should keep this base’. He 




Committee, and Rear Admiral Oscar Badger, who by 1948 commanded the Seventh 
Fleet that advancing communists were about to push out of Tsingtao, China, the base 
and touted its long term utility.  Early in 1949, only a few days after he stunned official 
Tokyo by saying that Japan had no strategic value to the United States, Army Secretary 




The Navy captain also broadcast news of what was happening in Yokosuka back to the 
United States through every means that he could. He welcomed religious figures, like 
Father Flanagan, the founder of the famous Boys’ Town orphanage; Francis Cardinal 
Spellman, the pope’s vicar to the American armed forces; and Protestant missionary 
leaders. He cultivated the press, greeting  visiting newspaper publishers and contacting 
members of the Tokyo Press Club. That got results in the form of numerous news 
stories and articles about Yokosuka in two of the most popular magazines in America, 
the Readers’ Digest  and the National Geographic.
64 
 
Decker also reached out to an ever-widening circle of important Japanese to let them 
see how Yokosuka was changing and to plant seeds of possible permanence for the 
American presence there. Kanagawa Prefecture Governor Uchiyama Kantaro quickly 
became a friend, and as early as August 1946 Decker hinted to him that even though it 
currently appeared that the Navy would not stay for long, the Americans would have to 
remain – to keep the Russians from coming in and to allow war-devastated Japan to sit 
on the sidelines of a possible Soviet-American war.
65 The Deckers brought the 
emperor’s younger brother Prince Takamatsu, a former Imperial Japanese Navy officer, 
back to Yokosuka, ostensibly in his capacity as patron of the Japan Red Cross; he and 
his wife became frequent visitors and genuine friends over the years. Contacts with the 
imperial family continued, and in the spring of 1949, Decker arranged a tour of the base 
for the emperor’s three younger sons. Given sailor hat souvenirs, they asked for one 
more for their elder brother, the Crown Prince.  In April of that year Decker entertained 
ten Diet members and sent all other Diet members passes to enter the base so as to let 
them know that ‘they were more than welcome to see what we were doing with the 
base’. Finally, in May 1949, the Deckers brought Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to 








Before 1949 ended, Decker was doubly honored for the peaceful coexistence in a 
reformed Yokosuka that he had worked so hard to create. In May he was at long last 
promoted to rear admiral, and instead of retiring, as was the norm, he was extended on 
active duty at Yokosuka for another year. SCAP himself was so impressed with what he 
had achieved there that he considered sending him to Okinawa to try to achieve a 
similar success.  In November, the mayor and city assembly installed his bust in front of 
the city hall. On the occasion of its installation, Prime Minister Yoshida, then in his dual 
capacity as Foreign Minister, sent a message of congratulations that was read to the 
assembled crowd.
67 Such recognition only redoubled Decker’s determination to see that 
the U.S. Navy remained in Yokosuka long after the signature of any possible peace 
treaty. 
 
IV:  Deciding to Remain, 1947-1951 
But did the changes in Yokosuka that ‘Benny’ Decker promoted and publicized make 
any real difference in shaping the specific terms of the eventual peace settlement? I 
believe the answer to that question is clearly yes. The evolution of civil-naval relations in 
Yokosuka demonstrated, well before political leaders and diplomats began in earnest to 
define the security terms of the peace treaty, that retention of an American naval base 
in Japan was a viable option. Thanks to ‘Benny’ Decker, policy makers and ordinary 
citizens in both Japan and America were aware of that possibility.  But it remained for 
government leaders to make the choice to keep Yokosuka as an American naval base 
after conclusion of a peace treaty. How, then, did leaders on opposite sides of the 
Pacific come to agree that the ‘Yokosuka option’ was the preferred solution to America’s 
defense problems and Japan’s security dilemma? 
 
The paths by which they came to that conclusion were quite distinct. In Washington, 
decision-makers, both within the Navy and beyond it, traveled a twisted road to that 
end. Their choices were constrained during the first two postwar years by what 
appeared to be conflicting international and domestic political considerations. On the 




Soviet hostility and the weakness of wartime allies required creation and maintenance 
of the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.
68 But on the other, public and 
congressional support for maintenance of a large navy dropped dramatically. Admirals 
and generals plunged, moreover, into a bitter fight over service roles, missions, and 
declining budgets that created a poisonous atmosphere within the Pentagon – hardly 




Thus in the spring and summer of 1947, following General MacArthur’s futile call for an 
early Japanese peace treaty, the Navy, its sister services, and the State Department 
found themselves unable to agree on the specifics of American security needs in and 
around Japan. Joint Chiefs of Staff planners deemed the island nation the most 
important strategic position for the United States in East Asia, concluding that it would 
be impossible to retain the use of Chinese ports as communist forces advanced. The 
more they thought about what a Soviet-American war might look like, the clearer it 
became that the United States must maintain an essentially maritime ‘offensive-
defensive’ strategic posture in the Western Pacific. Successive revisions of war plans 
moved from essentially defensive antisubmarine warfare to offensive, if not pre-emptive, 
naval and air strikes against Soviet ports and other East Asian industrial facilities.
70  
 
When in August 1947, in reaction to the State Department’s initial draft peace treaty for 
Japan – one which envisaged four-power enforcement of its terms – Navy 
representatives called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the question of base 
retention in Japan  ‘as a matter of priority’, the chiefs spurned their request.
71 Moreover, 
a clear difference of opinion between admirals and diplomats surfaced.  Acting upon the 
advice of the rear admiral responsible for political-military affairs, the Chief of Naval 
Operations admitted that there were objections to maintaining a ‘semi-permanent base’ 
in Japan after conclusion of a peace treaty. He felt it would be ‘prudent’, however, to 
retain the freedom of action to disagree with any action that might prejudice the chances 
of retaining the Yokosuka base and its facilities.
72 But State Department Policy Planning 
staffers, while eager to keep the Soviet Union out of a friendly Japan, thought American 




Okinawa, would suffice to achieve that end. Only ‘in the extreme event’ would keeping 
US forces in the Japanese home islands be necessary.
73 
 
Over the next year little progress was made in resolving this difference. George Kennan 
went to Japan in March 1948 to assess its place in American grand strategy. Chief of 
Naval Operations Louis Denfeld told him, prior to his departure, that the United States 
had ‘nuclei of naval bases’ in Japan, and added that Yokosuka was the most valuable 
among them. General MacArthur, however, told Kennan that Okinawa should be 
transformed into America’s Western Pacific stronghold. Although that ‘typhoon-ridden, 
poverty-burdened’ island held no charms for any operationally minded naval officer, 
Vice Admiral Robert M. Griffin, ‘Benny’ Decker’s immediate superior, first told Kennan of 
Yokosuka’s value and then implied that the Navy would not be ‘averse’ to developing an 
Okinawan base instead.
74  Seven months later, the best the National Security Council 
could produce was a very muddy policy statement: the Navy should ‘shape its policy’ so 
as to retain use of Yokosuka on a commercial basis and simultaneously ‘develop the 
possibilities of Okinawa’ as a base.  Doing the latter would not preclude the former, so 
long as the prevailing international situation and American political objectives at the time 




The prospects for such a treaty did not brighten until the autumn of 1949. By  that time, 
American diplomats, politicians, and strategists all worried about the consequences of 
China’s ‘fall’ to communist control. In the view of State Department Japan experts, that 
made it all the more urgent to Tokyo on Washington’s side by moving as quickly as 
possible toward conclusion of a peace treaty. Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
recognized that he needed an East Asian ‘success’ after ‘failure’ in China.
76 In June 
1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed Japan’s importance in American grand 
strategy: continued American military presence there would force the Soviets to think 
about a two-front war, stiffen Japanese resistance to communist pressures, and provide 
‘staging areas’ from which Washington could project its power onto the East Asian 
mainland. A base at Okinawa could not meet those requirements, and so 






This statement reflected a new convergence of strategic and budgetary thinking within 
the American armed services, and it paved the way for State Department endorsement 
of the concept of retaining post-peace treaty bases in Japan. In 1947, army, navy, and 
fledgling air force leaders had been so at odds with one another that no common 
posture in dealing with diplomats was possible. By 1949, however, leaders of all three 
services recognized that bases in Japan could help check what they perceived as a 
growing threat from China and the Soviet Union on the East Asian mainland. As they 
prepared to withdraw American occupation troops from the Korean peninsula, Japan 
provided an attractive alternative. Moreover, keeping and maintaining forces there was 
cheaper and operationally more effective than doing so in the United States.
78  
 
As ‘Benny’ Decker pointed out, Yokosuka in fiscal year 1949 provided a million dollars 
more in services than it cost to operate, and replacing the base could cost over six 
hundred millions.
79 With the services in agreement on base retention, the State 
Department’s principal Japan peace treaty drafter, Robert Fearey, moved in September 
1949 from neutrality toward basing to advocating the retention of U.S. forces in Japan 
‘in defined bases on a self-supporting basis’ for up to ten years following the conclusion 
of a peace treaty. 
80 
 
By early December 1949, even General MacArthur was inclined to accept that concept. 
While he still thought Okinawa should be developed into the principal base for American 
forces, he acknowledged that the United States would have to retain a ‘token force’ at 
air and naval bases in the Japanese home islands until facilities could be built there.
81 
That was a very distant prospect, given President Truman’s agreement with 
congressional defense budget cutters.  
 
MacArthur’s drift toward ‘Benny’ Decker’s position may also have reflected an 
awareness of trends in American public opinion. When, in February 1949, Army 
Secretary Kenneth Royall had hinted that peace might permit the departure of American 
forces from Japan, the press exploded in criticism. The New York Times editorialized 
that withdrawal from a militarily defenseless Japan was unacceptable ‘on either moral or 
strategic grounds’. Its military affairs critic and the editors of Newsweek magazine and 




important’ Pacific base.  Keeping U.S. forces there was the way to preserve the peace 
of the Pacific and American security won in the war against Japan, the San Francisco 
Chronicle editorialized. Gallup poll numbers confirmed strong public opposition to 
withdrawing American forces from Japan.
82   
 
Those numbers, and his sense that further delay might be fatal to retaining Japan’s 
friendship, prompted Secretary of State Dean Acheson to renew, that same autumn of 
1949, efforts to get the Pentagon to agree on an early Japanese peace settlement.
83 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered their subordinates to update their studies of Japan’s 
strategic significance, and these confirmed the importance of retaining bases there from 
which ‘offensive operations’ could be conducted against the Soviet Union. As if to 
reinforce that point, the Chief of Naval Operations announced that the Seventh Fleet 
would be reinforced by the aircraft carrier Boxer and additional destroyers. At the same 
time, however, the chiefs urged limited rearmament of Japan and opposed 
commencement of negotiations looking toward a peace treaty.
84   
 
The need to break the bureaucratic stalemate between the State and Defense 
Departments set the stage for a series of American officials’ trans-Pacific missions to 
Japan in the winter and spring of 1950. First Dean Acheson’s principal counsellor, then 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to Tokyo.
85 ‘Benny’ Decker worked behind the scenes 
beforehand to try to get the Marine Corps’ commandant to persuade the chief of naval 
operations to commit to permanently stationing a fleet marine force at Yokosuka. While 
he failed in that attempt, he did get maximum exposure, at home and in Japan, for the 
chiefs’ visit to the naval base there.
86 The chiefs’ visit produced a strong inter-service 
consensus on the need to retain the Yokosuka base, and other mainland Japanese 
bases, regardless of what might eventually be built on Okinawa.
87 A spate of newspaper 
editorials followed that echoed that conclusion: bases in Japan, including Yokosuka, 
must be retained as part of a systematic projection of American power to shores of East 
Asia. 
88 Little wonder, then, that Secretary of State Dean Acheson decided in April 1950 
to let the Pentagon define what America’s specific security requirements in Japan in any 






That decision, and his acceptance of John Foster Dulles as a special counselor with 
responsibility for a Japanese peace treaty, set the stage for two American official 
missions to Tokyo in June 1950.  Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, accompanied by 
JCS Chairman Omar Bradley, in effect ratified the decision about bases in Japan that 
the chiefs and the defense secretary had already made. The two men visited Yokosuka, 
where Rear Admiral Decker gave them a tour and a briefing that emphasized, for the 
parsimonious Johnson, the cost-effectiveness of base operations under his command.
90 
John Foster Dulles, who rejected neutrality for Japan and recognized that accepting 
what the chiefs wanted was an essential precondition for negotiating a treaty, helped 
nudge General MacArthur toward a more expansive version of the Joint Chiefs’ position: 
all of Japan, not just Okinawa or Yokosuka or some other specific point, must be 
regarded as a base for American forces until, in the words of the Potsdam Declaration, 
‘irresponsible militarism’ was driven from the world. MacArthur, in turn, made clear his 
strong conviction that a peace treaty should be concluded as soon as possible. 
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That meeting of the minds set the stage for what became Washington’s definitive 
statement of American policy regarding the bases, including Yokosuka, in Japan. As 
Dulles prepared to begin in earnest negotiations looking toward a peace treaty, the 
secretaries of state and defense agreed upon, and President Truman concurred in, a 
statement on American security requirements in a Japanese peace treaty. That treaty 
‘must give the United States the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, wherever, for 
so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary’ as well as exclusive control over 
Okinawa. Details regarding the relationship of American forces on bases in Japan to the 
government in Tokyo, cost-sharing, and other administrative matters were to be the 
subject of a Japanese-American ‘supplementary bilateral agreement’ that would come 
into effect at the same time as the peace treaty.
92 
 
That agreement of September 8, 1950, was reached as American and United Nations 
forces were preparing to land at Inchon and restore Seoul to the control of the 
government of South Korea. But the essential consensus within the American 
government on retaining Yokosuka and other bases in Japan, was defined, as the 
foregoing has shown, well in advance of the outbreak of war in Korea. Rear Admiral 




much as he could.  In the last analysis, however, Washington policy-makers agreed to 
retain the base for a combination of strategic, bureaucratic political, and financial 
reasons that were far more complex than anything even he could have imagined. In so 
doing, they set the stage for  the Japanese Government, in the person of Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru, to decide whether or not to accept a potentially permanent American 
naval (and military) presence in his country. 
 
By the time that President Truman decided that retention of American bases in Japan, 
including Yokosuka, must be an essential condition of any peace settlement, Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru, the man who more than any other shaped Japan’s foreign 
policy, had come to the same conclusion. Between September 1950, when Truman 
made that decision, and late January 1951, when John Foster Dulles came to Tokyo to 
implement it through ‘consultations’ with the Japanese, Yoshida shaped a consensus 
within his government and among Japanese conservatives in favor of accepting the 
continued presence of American bases. His decisions and actions go far in explaining 
why retention of the bases, a concept which grated against nationalism on the Right and 
on the Left, did not prove a contentious issue in the talks with Dulles that shaped the 
basic security features of the Japanese peace settlement.  
 
How and why did Yoshida come to a decision in favor of allowing the continuation of a 
foreign military and naval presence after conclusion of a peace treaty? While a full 
answer to that question lies beyond the scope of this essay, several important points 
about his choices are pertinent here. The first is how early Yoshida grasped base 
continuation as the preferred solution to Japan’s post-Article 9 security dilemma. He 
certainly knew and approved of Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi’s September 1947 
suggestion to retiring Eighth Army commander General Robert L. Eichelberger and 
Australian Foreign Minister Herbert V. Evatt that the United States and Japan might, as 
part of a peace settlement, agree that American forces remain in Japan, on ‘off-shore 
islands’, after its conclusion.
93 As early as May 1949, he expressed the thought that an 
‘overall peace’,” including the Soviet Union and other communist states, an 
arrangement favored by intellectuals and his opponents on the Left, was impractical. 
Nine months later, he told a junior American diplomat that Japan would have to rely on 








Those remarks proved a prelude to Yoshida’s  May 1950 dispatch of Finance Minister 
Ikeda Hayato, his sometime advisor Shirasu Jiro, and financial expert Miyazawa Kiichi 
to Washington. Their ostensible purpose was to discuss economic recovery plans with 
the Detroit banker turned financial counsellor, Joseph E. Dodge. In fact they hinted at 
Japan’s growing desire for American protection, telling Dodge that if Washington 
hesitated to ask for retention of its bases and forces, the Japanese government would 
‘try to find a way to offer’ conditions that would allow such. This offer, which was passed 
on to State Department officials and General MacArthur, was made well in advance of 
the outbreak of the Korean War.
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The second point, one that bears repeating, is Yoshida’s awareness of the Yokosuka 
option. While it would be wrong to suggest that that consciousness caused him to make 
the choice he did, it seems clear that he opted for base retention knowing that the 
Americans were giving serious consideration to the idea. In the summer of 1947, after 
the failure of General MacArthur’s call for an early peace treaty but before Foreign 
Minister Ashida gave his memorandum to Eichelberger and Evatt, two articles on 
retention of Yokosuka appeared on the news wires.  In the first, dated June 22, ‘Benny 
Decker’ suggested that the United States might keep it as a ‘Guantanamo of the Orient’, 
using funds from reparations to pay for its long-term lease.  In the second, on July 17, 
he stressed the value of Yokosuka’s facilities and workers and suggested that a 
separate Japanese-American agreement, concluded after a peace treaty, could 
guarantee their continued use to the United States.
96  Yoshida approached Ikeda about 
going to Washington late in February 1950, scarcely three weeks after the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff had made their highly publicized tour of Yokosuka and other bases in Japan. By 
the time Ikeda met Dodge, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had already conceded to 




But Yoshida, like all Japanese leaders, had to build consensus in favor of allowing 




anticipation of John Foster Dulles’s return to Tokyo for specific talks on the terms of a 
peace settlement, he had the Foreign Ministry and former military and naval leaders, in 
consultation with senior business leaders and opinion makers, prepare and debate four 
alternative plans for post-peace treaty security. On October 5, 1950, the head of the 
Foreign Ministry’s Treaty Bureau presented Plan A to Yoshida. It conceded that foreign 
troops might remain in post-treaty Japan in accordance with a bilateral security 
agreement, provided such respected the feelings of the Japanese people and the spirit 
of the United Nations. That same day Yoshida met with his non-military ‘brain trust’. 
While some of its members lofted the idea of a regional defense organization, Yoshida 
insisted that policy must be determined in terms of what was best for Japan. 
 
That prompted him to order the Foreign Ministry to prepare Plan B. It insisted that a 
separate security arrangement with the United States must avoid creating problems in 
terms of both Article 9 and relations with the Soviet Union. It drew upon NAT0 and the 
US-Philippine bases agreement for specific terms and argued that they must be 




Yoshida then had the Foreign Ministry prepare a third plan, C, which rested on a 
radically different set of premises. Rather than depend on the United States for its 
security, Japan (and Korea) would become the center of a demilitarized zone. That idea 
prompted what Yoshida most probably wanted – sharp objections from his informal 
group of military and naval advisors. Those men were more concerned about the 
Americans’ leaving Japan in the event of a major military challenge in Europe than 
about reactions of the Japanese public or the Soviet Union to their remaining.  Further 
discussions of a refined zone of disarmament plan, one which conceptually amounted to 
an updated version of the Washington Naval Arms Limitation and Pacific Island non-
fortification agreements of 1921-1922, resulted in consensus that such was simply too 
idealistic and impractical while war raged in Korea.
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Finally, a fourth position, Plan D, which tried to amalgamate acceptance of limited 
rearmament with continuation of US forces’ presence in Japan, was drafted by the 




January 1951. It stressed ‘equal partnership’ in defense matters with the United States, 
contemplated building a 150,000 man armed force, and, at Yoshida’s insistence, 
excised any lingering traces of regional disarmament.
100 Thus, well before Dulles 
arrived and made clear specific American desires for peace and security treaties, 
Yoshida had rejected others’ lingering desires for a return to something like the old 
Washington Conference Pacific Asian maritime order and defined the essentials of a 
new security policy that premised American military and naval presence as the keystone 
of Japan’s post-treaty security policy.   
 
In retrospect, three points about the Dulles-Yoshida conversations of January-February 
1951 stand out. First, the Japanese position was not based simply upon recognition of 
the need to bow before American force majeure, but on careful consideration of 
alternatives and voluntary choice before the ‘consultations’ began. Second, what 
Washington saw as necessary – temporary retention of control of Okinawa, early 
Japanese rearmament, and continuation of American military and naval presence, was 
far greater than anything ‘Benny’ Decker or Japanese Foreign Ministry officials earlier 
had imagined.  Third, there was a marked contrast between the way in which both sides 
dealt with base retention and their mode of dealing with the Okinawa and rearmament 
issues. Dulles, at General MacArthur’s suggestion, scotched any discussion of the 
former, but persistent debate between the negotiators and on the Japanese side, 
continued over the latter.
101 But both Yoshida and Dulles found it possible to accept, 
virtually without discussion, what had once seemed unthinkable – the continued 
presence of American forces in post-treaty Japan. By the time the Americans left Tokyo, 
the two sides had agreed on the essentials of what would become the U.S.-Japan 




The immediate explanation for that cooperation was, of course, the war raging on the 
Korean peninsula. That conflict made obvious America’s need for a forward naval and 
military presence in Japan; and it created a collaboration between Americans and 
Japanese working in and around those bases far greater, more intense, and more 
mutually profitable than anything ‘Benny’ Decker or the Japanese he invited to the 
Yokosuka base could have imagined earlier.




terms, that Yoshida could not have ‘played the bases card’. He could not have pressed 
the Americans for concessions on other issues in return for acceptance of bases 
because he had already made clear to Washington how much Japan desired U.S. 
forces to stay after a peace treaty.
104 But in retrospect a much broader reason for the 
ease with which Dulles and Yoshida agreed on retention of bases is clear: the 
cooperative spirit and peaceful civil-naval relations that emerged in Yokosuka (and 
elsewhere) demonstrated that Japanese and Americans could work together to 
preserve the security of both countries. The negotiators who went on to refine the terms 
of that accord and its accompanying administrative agreement governing the status of 
American forces in Japan were not dealing with legal or diplomatic abstractions, but with 
practical, working realities.
105 That, it may be said, was the U.S. Navy’s greatest 
contribution to the peace-making process. 
 
 V. Conclusion  
What, then, does the story of how the United States Navy came to acquire the 
Yokosuka base reveal about the larger peace making process that culminated in the 
treaties signed at San Francisco? 
 
The first and perhaps most important point to be made in response to that question is 
that the peace making process began long before diplomats and politicians put their 
hand to the wheel. It started with individual choices rather than governmental decisions. 
The first and most essential of those choices was for Japanese and Americans to 
regard one another as individual human beings rather than as abstract enemies. Those 
choices began to be made at Yokosuka in August 1945, blossoming from the individual 
to the community level, so that by 1949 the city was a working example of the kind of 
peace that could be achieved.  
 
The Yokosuka story also makes it clear that the U.S. Navy, in Japan and in Washington 
as well, took the lead in moving others toward conclusion of a peace settlement that 
would allow it to remain at Yokosuka. ‘Benny’ Decker outlined the essentials of what the 
Japan-United States security relationship would be for Governor Uchiyama in August 
1946, nearly a year before Douglas MacArthur issued his famous – and ineffective – call 




Japanese hosts had any doubts about his expectation that the Navy would long remain. 
By keeping the Yokosuka option before those superiors at a time when Washington 
politics and other, seemingly more important global strategic concerns pressed upon 
them, he provided vital support for their insistence that there could be no peace treaty 
without an American naval presence in Japan. By welcoming Japanese officials to the 
base, Decker provided them with a practical understanding of what post-peace treaty 
reliance upon American security assistance might be.  
 
Third, the evidence presented in this essay suggests very clearly that something other 
than the raw logic of great power politics shaped the security terms of the treaties 
signed at San Francisco. Decker’s – and the Navy’s – desires were checked and 
conditioned by bureaucratic politics and budget considerations as much as they were 
shaped by the events of the early Cold War years. Similarly, in Japan even Yoshida 
Shigeru, despite his ‘one man’ style of political leadership, moved cautiously toward 
formal acceptance of the American naval presence that he himself had seen at 
Yokosuka. Mindful of a nationalism that infected both his opponents on the Left and 
Right alike, he let Foreign Ministry officials and members of his ‘brain groups’ work 
through security alternatives in a way that led them to his original conclusion: continued 
American naval (and military) presence was the least costly and most practical means 
for preserving Japan’s post-peace treaty security. Thus Yokosuka’s continuation as an 
American naval base was as much a Japanese as an American policy decision.  
 
It also seems quite clear that Tokyo and Washington decided to make retention of an 
American naval presence in Japan a key element of the San Francisco settlement 
before the outbreak of the Korean War. That conflict provided, in a sense, a convenient 
fig-leaf for both governments to cover decisions taken before it began. The war also 
provided, for any lingering doubters of the value of an American naval presence in 
Japan, clear evidence of its operational and economic importance. The United States 
and its United Nations allies could not have fought the Korean War without bases in 
Japan. Japan would not have achieved economic stability and prosperity as rapidly as it 
did without American ‘special purchases’. The Japanese-American economic 
interdependence that manifested itself in Japanese production of trucks for the 








Finally, the Yokosuka story suggests one other important point about the San Francisco 
settlement. It was not something artificial, imposed by one side – America, Britain, and 
the other victors – upon the vanquished – Japan. It was a manifestation of an organic, 
symbiotic political, strategic, and economic bilateral relationship that had developed 
over the preceding six years. It did constitute a new Pacific/Asian maritime order, one 
marked by American naval pre-eminence tempered by dependence upon the 
cooperation of allies like Japan along the Asian littoral.  That order and the presence of 
the United States Navy in Japan continue to this day. That both have endured so for so 
many decades, long after the circumstances of the early Cold War era in which they 
were born have vanished, attests, in my view, to the wisdom of those who shaped the 
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YOSHIDA SHIGERU AND POLITICAL PARTIES￿ DIFFICULTIES OVER THE 
QUESTION OF THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY 
Kenji Tozawa 
 
Yoshida￿s Attitude towards Party Politics before the San Francisco Conference 
It seems that Yoshida Shigeru understood the significance of party politics or 
democratic rule from his experience in Britain as a diplomat, but his political 
behaviour was far removed from democracy before the Second World War, partly 
because democracy could hardly be seen in those days. But whether he liked it or not, 
Yoshida had to get involved in party politics after accepting the position of a party 
leader; and before the San Francisco Peace Treaty he succeeded in introducing party 
politics in Japan, though the final responsibility was taken by GHQ.
*   
 
In Japan especially before the Second World War many politicians sought power 
without principles. Their concern was mainly to obtain office. Office brought them 
money. As a result there were many changes of party-names and changes of 
politicians￿ affiliation. There were political parties; and changes of government 
occurred often. But there was no democratic control, and military power got involved 
with politics. Party politics did not work. 
 
After the Second World War the JCP revived, and the JSP became strong. So the 
differences of principles between parties became explicit. The JLP and the DP were 
conservative, the JCP and the JSP were radical. The PCP was centre right. While the 
JLP was right wing and the JCP was left, three parties, the DP, the JSP, and the PCP 





* Abbreviations are explained on pages 47 and 48.] 
   
 
Yoshida started his career as a party politician by accepting the position of General 
Secretary (sōmu-kyokuchō) of the Japanese Liberal Party (nihon jiyūtō) in May 1946,  
[later becoming President at the General Meeting (tō taikai) in August.] He was 
appointed Prime Minister by the Showa Emperor based on the Meiji Constitution of 
Japan in May of the same year after holding office as Foreign Minister for 7 months.
1 
 
On the process of drafting the Constitution of Japan, GHQ suggested that another 
general election should be held. Yoshida government decided to hold it on 25 April 
1947. This time Yoshida had to be elected to the Diet. Yoshida had been inaugurated 
as Prime Minister under the practices of the old regime. This was the first time 
Yoshida had been faced with a personal election campaign based on party politics. 
 
Yoshida was elected, but his party lost in this election. The JSP became the largest 
party with 143 seats, and established a coalition government with the DP and the 
PCP.
2 In fact Yoshida was asked to join the government, but he insisted that party 
politics had to be conducted by parties that profess similar policies. So he refused to 
join the JSP-led coalition government. What Yoshida tried to do was to build up a 
formidable opposition in a political party system.   
 
Between April 1947 and October 1948 the JSP, the DP, and the PCP kept power 
under two governments. Katayama Tetsu of the JSP formed the government from 1 
June 1947 to 10 February 1948, and Ashida Hitoshi of the DP from 10 March to 7 
October 1948. One can see the difficulties of these governments easily. They were a 
mixture of right wing and left wing opinion. Eventually the coalition governments did 
not last long because of inner discord, and after their collapse the LP naturally came 
back to power in October 1948. When Ashida, President of the DP, was elected prime 
minister in March, Shidehara and his group left the DP and joined the LP. Absorbing 
36 MPs the LP changed its name to the DLP (minshu jiyūtō ). As the LP government   
 
was still a hung parliament, Yoshida held a general election in order to strengthen the 
party on 23 January 1949, and established political stability by gaining a safe majority 
(264 out of 466 seats). As Table 2 shows, judging from the figures a two-party system 
between the LP and the JSP appeared possible in the 1950s.  
 
Political Parties￿ Difficulties over the San Francisco Peace Treaty   
As a defeated country Japan could not have many choices for the peace conference. 
But there were still many things to consider. The Japanese government had started to 
make up a draft of a peace treaty in 1946; and as part of it ￿the Present Economic 
Situation￿, and ￿the Present Political Situation￿, and ￿the Territory Problem￿ were 
written with great effort. Since the DS (Diplomatic Section of SCAP) informally 
received these documents in 1948, Yoshida government added more documents on 
the Japanese population problem, war damages, Japanese standard of living, the 
reparation question, shipping, fishing and other questions till 1950.  
 
It seems that three choices had to be made among the problems with which the 
Japanese government was faced before the peace conference. Firstly, whether 
Japan should negotiate with all the allies (zenmen kōwa) or with each country 
(tandoku kōwa) was one of the biggest issues. It should be noted that trade with 
China was a major issue when negotiation with all the allies was under consideration. 
Secondly, whether Japan should introduce rearmament after independence or 
observe disarmed neutrality or introduce some other security policy was a really 
serious concern. And thirdly, whether the reform of the Constitution of Japan was 
necessary or not was also a great issue. 
 
To Yoshida￿s mind there was really no possibility of negotiation with all the allies since 
the confrontation between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union was becoming serious 
and Mao Ze-dong￿s Chinese Communist Party had participated in the Korean War  
 
fighting against the U.S.-led UN Forces. But many Japanese intellectuals embraced 
quite different ideas from Yoshida￿s. The Talking Group on Peace Question (heiwa 
mondai konwakai) consisting of famous scholars issued statements several times. 
They insisted that the negotiation should be with all the allies, and made the two 
points that Japan would be faced with jeopardy in the future without a treaty with the 
Soviet Union and the PRC; and that Japan would have to sacrifice her trade with the 
continent through making a treaty with the ROC.  Very few scholars were for 
Yoshida￿s choice. But in reality negotiation with all the allies together was impossible. 
Even the statement of the Talking Group on 15 January 1950 described its conclusion 
as follows: 
 
￿As for the Peace Talks, if we Japanese can express our hopes, there is no 
course but making peace with all the allies￿.
3 
 
The Yoshida DLP Government recognized this as a mere dream or an expression of 
Japanese people￿s wish, and never changed its policy. Yoshida negotiated with the 
U.S.A. as there was no alternative, and as a security policy he rejected both 
rearmament and disarmed neutrality, and introduced no substantial rearmament with 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, though he agreed to build up the SDF (jieitai) in order 
to meet part of the request of John Foster Dulles, the envoy of the US Secretary of 
State. As for the Constitution of Japan Yoshida believed that it should not be changed 
easily unless the demand for reform became overwhelming. He explained these 
policies in his memoirs. First he made clear his policy on how to proceed with the 
peace negotiations. 
 
￿The idea of peace with all the allies was just a delusion of those who did not 
know the reality of international relations, therefore it was out of question. I 
believe that those who knew the political situation even a bit agreed with each 
other that there was no other way of conducting the peace talks except that of 
the San Francisco Conference.￿
4  
 
Let us hear the reasons for a non-rearmament policy. 
 
￿The question of rearmament was one of the biggest issues while I was in 
office, especially in the latter years I myself never sought rearmament, rather 
disagreed with it. It will be a great burden for any country to try to be equal to 
the U.S.A. Even if we spend such a vast expense on armament as America, it 
is doubtful whether we can achieve highly modern armaments to that extent. 
Besides, a defeated country like Japan never can expect to have such 
large-scale rearmament. This is my first reason for being against rearmament. 
Secondly, in terms of people￿s thinking the psychological foundation for 
rearmament has been lost totally. Thirdly, the great misery and cruelty still 
haunt the people who went to war without reason.
5  To make my own position 
crystal-clear on this point, I declared in my policy speech delivered at the 
opening of the fifteenth session of the Diet, following the formation of my 
fourth Cabinet in October 1952, that Japan should naturally reinforce its 
defensive power as the nation￿s economy recovered, but that the time had not 
yet arrived, by any means, to consider rearmament. To subsequent questions 
I replied that, if rearmament was to be undertaken, it would have to be 
achieved with the acquiescence of the Japanese people.￿
6  
 
As for the Constitution of Japan, Yoshida estimated the ideal character highly, saying 
that  
￿there are those also who lay emphasis on the fact that the Constitution was 
framed immediately after a disastrous war and when the country was under 
the military Occupation of foreign Powers. There exists little reason for being 
sensitive to the circumstances in which Japan￿s present Constitution was 
drawn up. It is far more important to consider whether or not that document 
actually operates to the advantage of the Japanese people.￿
7  
 
But it should be understood that Yoshida￿s original idea of a constitution was quite 
different from the present one. He accepted it as a compromise. Thus Yoshida 
adopted the broad interpretations of the Constitution. 
 
￿In regard to the position of our Emperor, for instance, he is defined as ￿the 
symbol of the state and of the unity of the people￿, legally speaking, sovereign 
power has passed from the Emperor to the people. Whatever the vicissitudes 





While the Japanese government decided its policies with a safe majority, the JSP kept 
its policy similar to the Talking Group on Peace Question supporting the peace 
negotiations being opened with all the allies, disarmed neutrality depending upon the 
protection of the collective security of the United Nations, and the vindication of the 
Constitution of Japan. In fact the JSP was split into two wings by the discord over 
accepting the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as 
Table 3 shows. The right wing supported the San Francisco Peace Treaty but not the 
Security Treaty. The left wing was against both treaties the same as the JCP.   
 
The DP (after March 1950 the party￿s name was the PDP-kokumin minshutō) 
basically voted for two treaties. But many politicians of this party did not support 
Yoshida￿s security policy, which meant that Japan would not go for rearmament, and 
Japan would not build up war potential, and yet Japan would have SDF. As depicted 
above, Yoshida adopted a broad interpretation of the constitution, which was to be 
called later ￿a reform of the constitution with reinterpretation (kaishaku kaiken)￿. 
 
Difficulties after the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
After the Peace Treaty was signed, Yoshida had difficulties at the Diet where the 
treaty had to be ratified. The atmosphere became confrontational, and many 
questions were focused on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Ashida Hitoshi, the former 
prime minister, debated the contradictions within the government￿s policy. According 
to Ashida, the Self Defense Forces would be unconstitutional because the 
Constitution did not allow Japan to hold any war potential, or if Japan could maintain 
the right of minimum self-defence, why did Japan not regain its military forces? But 
Yoshida never changed his view that Japan would not rearm but keep the SDF since 
Japan had a right of self-defence. Questioning was severe, but the party in power was  
strong enough to pass the ratification bill same year.   
 
After the ratification Yoshida had the most difficult problem on peace talks with China. 
On  10 December 1951 Dulles came to Japan with two Senators to press the 
Japanese government to enter into a treaty with the ROC. Yoshida had been told after 
the Dulles-Morrison Agreement in June 1951 that Japan was free to choose either the 
ROC or the PRC to make a peace treaty with. As Yoshida understood the situation of 
the Congress, he made a promise to enter a treaty with the ROC, but tried to keep the 
door open to the PRC, too. The Japan-China Peace Treaty (nikka heiwa jōyaku) was 
signed on 28 April 1952, the same day as the coming into effect of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty. The opposition parties criticised this treaty, but again the Yoshida 
government could afford to turn down the opposition parties￿ complaints. Especially 
the JSP warned the government of the danger of loss of trade with the PRC. Though 
Yoshida knew the point, he denied the importance of trade with the PRC. If you look 
at Table 4, it is easy to understand that Yoshida was aware of the devastating 
situation of the continent at that time. 
 
The real problems could be seen only inside the LP. But the true row inside the party 
was not related to a particular policy but a power struggle. Within the LP there were 
some politicians who believed in the necessity of maintaining the Self Defense Forces 
based on the reformed Constitution of Japan. Hatoyama, though he was still out of 
public office, and the politicians of his faction insisted on not amending part of the 
Constitution of Japan but reassessing it entirely. But what Hatoyama wanted was to 
make Yoshida return the premiership to him.   
 
After the big job of signing the treaties and getting their ratification through the Diet, 
Yoshida never dissolved the Diet, nor returned power to Hatoyama, the former 
president of the LP, not to mention to the Opposition. Since the seats held by the  
 
opposition parties were much less than the LP, there was no possibility for the 
opposition parties to gain political power. But Hatoyama￿s faction could cooperate 
with the DP, and if the coalition exceeded half of the seats, it was possible for it to 
change the government. Instead of giving a chance to the opposition, Yoshida 
struggled to keep political power.   
 
One can point out that Yoshida￿s endeavour to retain power as long as possible could 
be seen in two fields at least. Yoshida tried to form coalitions with other political 
groups to make the LP bigger. In a sense Yoshida thoroughly knew the importance of 
the number of seats held in a democracy. In democracy it is natural that a political 
party tries to get as many votes as possible. Yoshida￿s party drew vast votes at every 
election, which was fine. But, apart from that, Yoshida always tried to pull the 
opposition parties down. In March 1948 the J LP absorbed Shidehara and his group 
from the DP and changed its name into the DLP. Further Yoshida￿s party annexed part 
of the DP (28 MPs) again and changed its name into the LP in March 1950. Finally 
Yoshida unsuccessfully tried to annex the PP (formerly the DP) in April 1953. As 
another case Yoshida did not put all possible efforts into lifting Hatoyama￿s purge. It is 
obvious that Yoshida wrote many letters to the SCAP begging to lift the purges. But 
Yoshida never wrote any letter about Hatoyama to SCAP. In June 1951 many war 
criminals came back to the political scene, and they were waiting for the next general 
election. But Hatoyama￿s name was not there. Only after knowing that Hatoyama had 
a stroke at his house in June did the announcement reached him in August. Yoshida 
wrote in his memoirs that he was surprised to know that Hatoyama was unwell when 
the purge-lift notice reached him, but since he had written a kind letter immediately 
after Hatoyama fell down in June, he should have been fully aware of the situation.
9  
 
Yoshida￿s solid beliefs and MacArthur as supreme power (saikō kenryoku)  
 
Yoshida was surrounded with many difficulties outside and inside the party. It seems 
that there were two reasons to be able to break through all difficulties before the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. One was his strong belief, which became the cornerstone of 
his party￿s policies. It was that Japan must follow the policy of anti-communism, of 
economic development with the first priority of retaining good relationships with the 
U.S.A. In addition he respected Japanese tradition and history, and hated drastic 
change and extreme instability. His choices over the San Francisco Peace Treaty can 
be explained from these beliefs.   
 
The other reason why Yoshida could overcome political-social turbulence was that 
the ultimate power, SCAP/GHQ, cooperated with Yoshida when he desperately 
needed help. One can find those occasions easily. On 1 February the General Strike 
was planned by the JCP, the JSP, and the trade unions. It was a crucial moment to 
keep political stability. But the SCAP instruction was issued by Douglas MacArthur on 
31 January and the strike was banned at the last moment. The Dodge budget was 
another example. It was the extreme austerity budget. It was actualised in April 1949, 
but eventually brought serious recession. In fact the national railway announced the 
displacement of 37,000 workers on 4 July, and 63,000 workers on 12 July. It was part 
of a plan for the 220,000 civil servant￿s displacement. President of National 
Corporation of Railway Shimoyama Sadanori disappeared the day following the 
displacement notice and was found dead on 6
th. Other mysterious incidents followed, 
the Mitaka Incident in July, and the Matsukawa Incident in August. Social convulsion 
was conspicuous. Yoshida wrote several letters to SCAP and GS, expressing his own 
determination to pacify the riotous situation and asking for more information and the 
centralisation of police power.
10 There was no doubt that Yoshida was zealous in 
stabilising the society. As Inoki Masamichi stressed, without Yoshida￿s solid 
determination it would not have been possible to reduce such a vast number of civil  
 
servants. Also it would have been tremendously difficult to regain social stability 
without the back-up of the super power of GHQ.
11  
 
After the San Francisco Peace Treaty political turbulence took place, but there was no 
super power of GHQ any longer. Immediately after the treaty came into effect on 28 
April 1952, the labour movement organized a violent riot on May Day. One man was 
killed and about 1,000 people were arrested, and many casualties were hospitalised. 
It was called the Bloody May Day. 
 
Looking back on politics after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Yoshida was clearly 
losing his authority and yet he never thought of giving up political power. Hatoyama 
and his group still aimed for power within the LP, and since they realised Yoshida 
would never give a chance to anybody else to become Prime Minister as long as the 
LP kept its majority, they decided to split the LP and established a new party, the JDP, 
on 24 November 1954. 121 MPs belonged to the JDP, 185 remained in the LP. It was 
a final blow to Yoshida￿s government. In a sense Yoshida was kicked out of his party 
by the rest of faction leaders. Yoshida resigned on 7 December. 
 
Conclusion  
Yoshida did not want drastic changes in the Japanese regime. He wanted a so-called 
soft landing. He adopted neither rearmament nor unarmed neutrality. Instead he 
clearly chose non-rearmament, and yet gradually expanded the security coverage of 
the Self Defence Forces.   
 
Yoshida wrote a letter to Dulles on 24 December 1951 promising to enter a peace 
treaty with the ROC not the PRC. This letter enabled the U.S. Congress to ratify the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty. But, because of this letter, Japan lost a chance to 
recognise the PRC and tie a peace treaty with it for a long time. And an awkward  
 
principle such as ￿the separation between politics and economy￿ was adopted towards 
the PRC. Kōsaka Masataka admitted that the resolution of China-Japan diplomacy 
had to be Yoshida’s chance to show his ability, but due to this letter it was frustrated.
12 
 
Yoshida’s real intentions are now clear. If there were no barriers, he wanted Japan 
independent with proper forces, and he also wanted to open the public relationship 
with the PRC as soon as possible. But his sharp sense of real politics forced him to 
apply soft landing politics. Yoshida’s politics has been criticized for his ￿double 




By the same token Yoshida resisted any change of political power. He was afraid to 
see completely different policies adopted by the opposition parties. Hence his 
followers also took the same guidelines. Drastic changes were avoided, and the 
system of one dominant party with no change of a party in power where political 
power circulated inside factions (habatsu tarai-mawashi seiken) was established. In 
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Table 1:    Results of General Elections between 1945 and 1955 (Shugiin-Lower House) 
    
  Total 
seats 
LP  DP  PCP  JSP    JCP  others 
1946.4 
 




14 93    5  81 
1947.4 
 
466 131  DP 
121 
29 143    4 38 
1949.1 
 
466  DLP 
264 
69 14  48    35  36 
1952.1 
 











466 234  76    72  66  1  17 
1955.2 
 
467 112 JDP 
185 
 89  67  2  12 
1958.5 
 
467  LDP 
267 
   168    1  13 
 
Source: Masumi Junnosuke, Politics After the War 1945-55 (Sengo seiji 1945-55)  
(Tōkyō UP, 1983), vol. 2, Appendices p. 23. 
   
  Key:  LP  -  Liberal Party (jiyuto) 
   DP  -  People￿s Democratic Party (kokumin minshuto) 
   JSP -  Japanese Socialist Party (nihon shakaito) 
   JCP -  Japanese Communist Party (nihon kyosanto)   
     
 
Table 2: Opinion Polls between 1950 and 1956 
 
  Conservative Subtotal  J S P  Others  No Party No Answer  Subtotal 
 1950.2 DLP  2 9  DP    5 34  15  2  18  31  49 
50.4  LP   32  6  38  16  4  9  33  42 
50.9 32  NDP   7  38  17  2  20  22  42 
1951.3  36 5 41  18 3 12  26  38 
51.9  45 5 50  10 1 17  22  39 
5110  32 5 37  12 2 26  23  49 
1952.2 33 PP    4  37  14  1  22  26  48 
52.5  32 5 37  18 1 19  25  44 
52.9  32 6 38  18 1 16  27  43 
1953.3 46  12  58  26  1  3  12  15 
 53.6  49  10  59  27  1  3  10  13 
53.9 48  7  55  26  1  4  14  18 
1954.5 39  7  45  27  2  5  18  23 
54.6 34  8  42  31  1  8  17  25 
54.12 28  DP   24 52  25  0  3  20  23 
1955.1 22  29  51  25  2  3  19  22 
55.11     LDP   48 31  2  4  15  19 
1956.6     43  33  3  4  17  21 
56.8     45  38  1  4  12  16 
     
Source: Masumi Junnosuke, Politics After the War 1945-55 (Sengo seiji 1945-55) (Tōkyō UP, 1983), 




Table3: Ratification Votes for the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty 
 
Lower House  Peace Treaty  Security Treaty 
     f o r     against    f o r       against 
LP 
 
  221      0   234        0 
DP 
 
    4 9       3     4 4         4  
JSP Right 
 
   2 4       0      0        2 3  
JSP Left 
 
    0      1 6      0        1 6  
JCP 
 
   0      2 2           0        2 2  
Others 
Independent 
   1 3       6     1 1         6  
 




Table 4: Foreign Trade of Japan 
 
       (In  millions  of  Yen) 
PRC  ROC   
Export  Import  Export  Import 
1946 222 303 1 30
1947 792 255 31 73
1948 292 1885 5 610
1949 3071 14520 2143 8933
1950 7068 14158 13684 12894
1951 2098 7779 18216 19089
1952 215 5365 21840 22955
1953 1634 10692 21948 23054
1954 6875 14677 23737 20552
1955 10277 29080 22978 29116
 
Source: Customs Division, Tax Bureau, Ministry of Finance. In Statistics of 
Ministry of Administration (nihon tōkei nenkan),   
1953, p. 240; 1958, p. 240. 
  
 
Britain and Japan, 1951: San Francisco and Tokyo 
Sir Hugh Cortazzi 
 
Peter Lowe in his article ‘Great Britain and the Japanese Peace Treaty, 1951’ (in 
‘Western Interactions with Japan: Expansion, The Armed Forces and 
Readjustment, 1859-1956’ Japan Library, 1990) described the British part in the 
negotiation of the Peace Treaty with Japan and concluded with a brief account of 
the conference in San Francisco and reactions in Tokyo. He also covered the 
British part in the peace Treaty negotiations in his chapter ‘Uneasy Readjustment, 
1945-58’ in volume II of the ‘Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000’ 
published as part of the Anglo-Japanese History Project (2000). 
 
I do not want to go over all the same ground, but, when I looked at some of the 
papers in the PRO of reports from the British Mission in Tokyo in the second half 
of 1951 and of letters from the Foreign Office to the British Mission in Tokyo, I 
thought that some of what was said in these papers was interesting and worth 
quoting. After drawing on these papers I propose to say a few words about my 
own involvement in Japan at that time. I arrived in October 1951 as a third 
secretary (a very junior post) in the United Kingdom Liaison Mission (UKLIM) to 
SCAP (the mission became the British Embassy in Tokyo when the Peace Treaty 
came into force at the end of April 1952). 
 
Rob Scott (later Sir Robert Scott) who had replaced Bill Dening (Sir Esler Dening, 
appointed to be Head of the British Mission in Tokyo in October 1951), as the 
Assistant Under Secretary responsible for Asian Affairs in the Foreign Office 
attended the San Francisco conference as one of the senior officials in the British 
delegation. This was led by Kenneth Younger, Minister of State in the Foreign 
Office. Herbert Morrison, the Foreign Secretary, who had planned a holiday at 
the time of the conference, reluctantly agreed to attend the conference for one 
day to sign the Treaty.  
 
Rob Scott in a personal letter to Bill Dening in Singapore on his way to Tokyo 
gave a frank account of the proceedings in San Francisco. He noted that the 
‘level of oratory’ of the delegations was ‘not very high’ (a Foreign Office  
 
euphemism for ‘low’ and ‘deadly boring’). Dean Acheson was, he said, ‘a great 
hit with the public’ (i.e. he played to the crowds!). 
  
Rob Scott had this to say of the Japanese at San Francisco: 
‘A strong Japanese delegation, decked out in frock coats of curious cut 
and various hues such as Japan alone finds it possible to produce, sat 
quietly to one side in the fifth and sixth rows of the opera house 
throughout the proceedings…They were, I think, genuinely very pleased 
indeed not only by the nature of the Treaty but also by the friendly attitude 
of the delegates towards them.’ 
 
Scott commented ‘My impression of Yoshida and indeed of the other Japanese 
delegates was that they genuinely want to cultivate very good relations with us. I 
would not exclude a desire in the back of their minds to play us off against the 
Americans and of course we must guard against this, but I think that there was a 
good deal of sincerity in Yoshida’s remark that for Japan there were only two 
countries that mattered: Britain and America.’ 
 
Yoshida had called on Kenneth Younger accompanied only by Matsui, his private 
secretary (later Japanese Ambassador to the UN). Yoshida ‘began by formally 
expressing the gratitude of the Japanese Government to the British Government 
for the part we had played in drawing up this generous peace treaty.’  
 
Yoshida later called on Herbert Morrison for what Scott described as ‘a long and 
friendly talk’ in which he reiterated his thanks for the part played by HMG. This 
conversation was summarised in a ‘saving telegram’ (a telegram sent by bag to 
save the chore of hand ciphering). This was No 1 Saving from San Francisco and 
was dated 8 September 1951. It was drafted by Rob Scott and approved by 
Herbert Morrison who made one change. He called Dening our ‘Ambassador’ 
and not simply head of the UK Liaison Mission. Scott was concerned that this 
might cause embarrassment to Dening as Britain could not seek agreement for 
him before the Peace Treaty had been ratified and we knew when it would come 
into force. But Dening had the personal rank of Ambassador and no harm was 
done by Morrison’s remark. 
  
 
Morrison urged Yoshida to take an interest in the Japanese trade union 
movement and to pay attention to the interests of Japanese workers. As Peter 
Lowe recorded the specific causes for concern felt by British firms and trade 
unions were directly cited by Morrison: ‘there was anxiety in Great Britain lest 
pre-war conditions of sweated labour and competition were revived. In the 
interests of the people of Japan and of relations between Japan and Britain it 
was essential that this should not happen. Indeed I felt that my signing of the 
Treaty would be justified only if the Japanese Government took steps to see that 
there was no recurrence of these conditions.’ This was tough talk and 
foreshadows the economic friction, which caused real difficulties in relations 
between Britain and Japan in the next few years.  
 
Morrison and Yoshida also briefly discussed China. Britain had recently 
recognized the Chinese Communists as the government of China. Recognition 
did not imply approval it was merely an acknowledgement of the fact that the 
communists were in control of China. The Foreign Office decision had been 
made while Dening was still the Assistant Under-Secretary and while fully 
endorsed by the British cabinet and by the Foreign Office legal advisers it was 
seen as an achievement of Dening’s time as Assistant Under Secretary. He and 
Morrison both hoped that Japan would follow suit or at least would not be swayed 
by the Americans into recognition of the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the 
Government of China.  
 
Yoshida stressed that in his view there could be no stability while communism 
prevailed. This was a point he returned to on a number of occasions later. He 
would not be drawn on the line, which Japan would take over recognition of 
China. It is not clear from the British papers, which I have seen, when John 
Foster Dulles began to urge Japan to reach an agreement with the Nationalists. 
He must have realised quite early on that it might be necessary to push the 
Japanese towards the Nationalists in Taiwan if the Treaty was to be approved by 
the US Senate. If the Americans had told the British at an early stage that this 
would be necessary some of the ill-feeling which arose over this issue might 
have been obviated. Perhaps the British Embassy in Washington drew attention  
 
to this aspect of the ratification problem, but I do not recall seeing any such 
report. Peter Lowe comments that Dulles acted contrary to the agreement 
reached with Morrison in June 1951 in putting pressure on Yoshida to recognize 
Chiang Kai-shek’s government, but ‘Given the vitriolic attitudes toward China 
found within the Republican party and bearing in mind Dulles’s political 
aspirations, he had little choice but to act as he did. Reactions in London were 
bitter.’ Eden who succeeded Morrison in October 1951 shared Morrison’s anger.  
Bill Dening thought he had been double-crossed by Dulles. Looking back after 
fifty years it is possible to understand British anger, but ratification by the US 
Senate of the Peace Treaty had to be the first priority. Delays in ratification could 
have had more far-reaching consequences for US relations with Japan and for 
the western position in Asia. An early Japanese recognition of the Peoples 
Republic of China would hardly have altered the course of history in Asia. 
 
Rob Scott also met in San Francisco the Social Democratic party leader 
Katayama Tetsu. Katayama had asked to call on Scott but then changed his 
mind and asked Scott to call on him. He seems to have thought Scott was an 
American! Rob Scott, who had suffered a great deal at the hands of the 
Japanese as a prisoner in Changi jail in Singapore during the war, never stood 
on ceremony or bore grudges against Japan; he responded positively. Katayama 
told Scott that his party were ‘quite satisfied with the Peace Treaty.’ 
 
Back in Tokyo the Peace Treaty was submitted to the Japanese Diet for 
ratification. According to a telegram (no 344) dated 16 October 1951 from Dening 
who had recently arrived in Tokyo Yoshida gave a speech at the opening of the 
12
th session of the Diet, which ‘consisted in the main of a lengthy recapitulation of 
the terms of the Treaty and followed the usual pattern which is now considered 
Mr Yoshida’s usual form, in that he contrived to make a major speech without 
saying anything that was not already fully known’. He confirmed that Japan 
‘would abide by the terms of the Treaty and carry it out in all sincerity in spite of 
the difficulties which some of the provisions would impose’. 
 
Dening commented that when he lunched with Yoshida on 7 October the latter 
had remarked, ‘in his usual puckish way, that it was better to tell the Japanese  
 
people what the Allied delegates at San Francisco thought of the Treaty than 
what he thought of it himself’. In his speech he had stressed that the Treaty 
represented what the allies wanted and that ‘what the allies want is what Japan 
has to accept.’ Dening thought that Yoshida’s attitude ‘contained an element of 
disdain for public opinion’. But looking back after fifty years we must conclude 
that Yoshida’s attitude was eminently realistic. 
 
The Diet duly approved the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty. The Peace 
Treaty was approved by the House of Representatives by 307 votes to 47 
against and by the House of Councillors by 174 to 45 votes. The US Japan 
Security Treaty, which was part of the package, was approved by 387 votes to 71 
in the lower house and 147 to 76 in the upper house. The opposition came 
essentially from the left wing socialists and the communists. The right wing 
socialists (i.e. social democrats) voted for the Peace Treaty but against the 
Security Treaty. The members of the Japanese Diet realised that they had ‘no 
real alternative’. In sum the Japanese accepted the Peace Treaty as the best 
they could hope for and determined to make the best of it. The opposition 
focussed on the Security Treaty and ensured that this would be the main political 
issue for years to come. 
 
Before Dening arrived in Tokyo in early October 1951, George Clutton, the 
Charge d’Affaires, had sent home various despatches commenting on the 
Japanese scene. In a despatch (No 242) of 16 July 1951 Clutton urged steady 
progress in the transfer of power from the occupation authorities to the Japanese. 
He noted that the Japanese were reluctant to assume further responsibility 
unless compelled to do so. The current level of efficiency in the Japanese civil 
service was ‘not high’. 
 
In his despatch (No 319) of 25 September 1951 Clutton gave a cautious 
assessment of ‘recent signs of a revival of nationalism in Japan’. His conclusion 
was: ‘all that can be said is that in an increasingly conservative and, therefore, in 
certain ways, Nationalist society, there are certain factors which could help in a 
Nationalist revival of a dangerous sort, but which at present are of little danger’. 
Democracy ‘had not yet taken firm root.’  
 
 
In another despatch (N0332) of 2 October 1951 Clutton surveyed Japan’s 
relations with the rest of Asia. He noted that the Japanese attitude to their fellow 
Asians was ‘one of unqualified superiority’ while towards China it was ‘one of 
qualified superiority’. He declared that the majority of Japanese at that time had 
‘no idea of the legacy of hatred they may have left’ in Asia. 
 
Dening in his despatch (No 373) of 26 November 1951 gave his assessment of 
the situation in Japan and of prospects for the future. This is a typically acerbic 
but balanced piece. He noted that ‘With a capacity for collective action 
unparalleled elsewhere in the world, the Japanese people have been doing a 
‘defeat drill’ for six years. Now that the Treaty is signed they consider the drill is 
over and they can hardly conceal their impatience for the day when the Treaty 
comes into force and they resume full sovereignty.’ Dening was ‘unable to 
discover that the Japanese people have changed very much, and indeed there is 
very little reason for them to have done so, since six years represent a very short 
span in the life of this nation.’  
 
He thought that militarism was ‘for the present discredited’, but most Japanese 
probably hope and expect that Japan will once again recover a place in the sun, 
and every Japanese remains as nationally conscious as he ever was’. He 
believed that ‘the prospects of good government in Japan in a Western 
democratic sense are not very encouraging.’ He was particularly conscious of the 
continuation of corruption in government, which had so undermined 
parliamentary institutions in pre-war years. He feared that extremism of the left 
might command wider support than extremism of the right. He expected that 
Japan would remain in the Western camp. There were good Japanese and bad 
Japanese. It must be the British aim to support the former. 
 
Dening stressed that in order to live Japan had to export and he sounded a note 
of warning about the dangerous implications of protectionism in relation to Japan. 
In this and other contexts we should consult with Commonwealth and European 
governments. Dening’s reference to European  governments at this point is of 
some significance.  
 
 
Dening, perhaps reflecting on Herbert Morrison’s comments to Yoshida at San 
Francisco, which I have outlined above, had sent a secret and personal telegram 
on 30 October 1951 to Sir William Strang, the Permanent Under Secretary. In 
this he had urged that Britain should move quickly on ratification of the Peace 
Treaty. He pointed out that ‘our own difficulties with Japan were likely to be in the 
economic field’ and noted that the US, ‘by and large, were not concerned about 
Japanese competition’. ‘We have said in public that Japan must live, and we 
must be careful not to put ourselves in a false and vulnerable position.’ Dening 
was right to warn London of the damage which a protectionist approach towards 
Japan would cause not only to our relations with post-war Japan but also to 
relations with the US whose economic assistance in the occupation years had 
saved Japan from starvation. The Americans at that time and in the next decade 
or so made the mistake of putting all the emphasis on politico-strategic relations 
with Japan and neglecting the economic dimension. When the extent of 
Japanese competition for American firms became clear the Americans realised 
their mistake. 
 
Dening’s relations with Yoshida were cordial, but as usual Yoshida played a 
canny game. In his despatch (No 339) of 12 October 1951, reporting on his 
private lunch with Yoshida, when relations with China had been a major theme, 
Dening said that he had suggested to Yoshida that while, of course, Japan must 
make her own choice she might ‘establish a modus vivendi both with the 
authorities in Formosa and with China proper’, Yoshida ‘was not to be drawn.’ 
Dening did not explain how he thought such a modus vivendi could be reached. 
Indeed in view of the PRC’s adamant opposition then and since to any 
suggestion of a two Chinas policy it was unrealistic. Yoshida probably realised 
this. 
 
The question of relations with China was one on which, as I have said above, 
Dening felt strongly. When Dulles accompanied by Senators Sparkman and 
Smith came to Japan that winter Dening who had had many dealings with Dulles 
over the Peace Treaty entertained them to dinner. As a junior secretary I was on 
duty. It was already clear that the Japanese would have to come to an  
 
arrangement with the Nationalists in Taiwan in order to secure US ratification, but 
Dening felt betrayed by Dulles. Dening who was the son of Walter Dening, an 
Anglican missionary, had no sympathy with Dulles whom he thought smug and 
self-righteous as well as deceitful.  So the atmosphere was cold and we were all 
glad when the American visitors withdrew. 
 
This was one of the few occasions in my early months in Tokyo after my arrival in 
late October 1951 when I was involved with higher policy issues. Arthur de la 
Mare who was then the Head of Chancery had been a member of the Japan 
Consular Service and a Japanese language student before the war. His attitude 
to post-war Japan was similar to that of his boss. Dening and he knew from 
personal experience what the militarists and the Kempeitai were really like and 
understandably took a pretty sceptical view of the Japanese who regained power 
in post-occupation Japan.  
 
Peter Lowe in his essay ‘Uneasy Readjustment’ drew attention to a despatch 
from Dening written on 28 April 1952, the day that the Peace Treaty came into 
force. Dening commented that ‘the most striking feature of the occupation had 
been the violent change in American policy, from preaching radical reform and 
disarmament to advocating rearmament and castigating all signs of weakness in 
combating communism. ‘Much of the good which the Occupation has 
undoubtedly brought to Japan is vitiated by this. Until two years ago complete 
pacifism was the badge and sign of progress and international respectability: 
today it is evidence of susceptibility to Communist indoctrination. Doubt has thus 
come to be cast on democracy, parliamentary institutions and all the other new 
wonders which the Occupation brought in its train.’  This was a harsh comment 
on the occupation, but though oversimplified it contained a kernel of truth. 
 
In the autumn of 1951, pending the entry into force of the Peace Treaty when 
sufficient ratifications had been lodged, the British Mission faced a major 
administrative challenge. During the occupation staff and services had been 
provided free by the Japanese authorities to Missions accredited to SCAP on the 
grounds that they were part of the occupation force. As soon as the occupation 
ended the mission would have to pay its own way. It would have to give up  
 
houses, which had been commandeered by the occupation forces, and find 
alternative accommodation in a city, which still showed the signs of war-time 
devastation and where acceptable western style accommodation was very 
difficult to find.  
 
The Mission only had a junior and inexperienced administration officer. So Arthur 
decided that I should deal with many of the pressing administrative issues. One 
tricky issue was local staff where each section of the Mission wanted to hang on 
to their existing staffs even though their productivity was low and some really had 
very little to do. Austerity was very much the order of the day and the Foreign 
Office told us that we would have to make draconian cuts. One of my tasks was 
to negotiate on Arthur’s behalf with the various sections. Not surprisingly I was 
pretty unpopular!  
 
Another major task, which fell to me, was to help in looking for alternative 
accommodation. Much of what we found was distinctly sub-standard and staff 
had to be persuaded reluctantly to take what was available. We noted that rents 
seemed very high in relation to the cost of purchase. Often two to three years 
rent, much of which in any case had to be paid in advance in the form of key 
money and deposits, would amount to as much as the purchase price. We 
explained this to the authorities in London and urged that we be given authority 
to purchase some of the better properties, which became available, but they 
would not listen. HMG would have saved quite a tidy sum if they had been willing 
to go into the real estate business in Japan!  
 
I was only able to pull one deal off.  We were offered at very reasonable prices 
three houses which had been German property and which under the Peace 
Treaty were forfeit. The Admiralty wanted a house for the Naval Attache and 
were not inhibited by Foreign Office rules. They agreed that we might purchase 
the best of these three houses for what, if I remember correctly, was about 
£3,000, which even in those penurious days was a very good price. Eventually it 
was sold, I think in the 1980s when it had become increasingly run down, for 
getting on for £1 million! 
  
 
This purchase brought me into touch with a most unattractive part of the 
Japanese bureaucracy. To complete the purchase innumerable forms had to be 
completed and I had to deliver the cheque in person to the official concerned. I 
recall that he received me with his feet on the desk in front of him and paring his 
nails. When I handed over the cheque he made some sneering remarks about 
sterling implying that he trusted that the cheque would not bounce. 
 
It was, I suppose, inevitable that Japanese officials longing for an end to the 
occupation would take every opportunity to get in a few hits at the foreigners who 
had dominated their lives for the last six years, but it was not a pretty sight and 
did not endear me to the new Japan. 
 
While the officials in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance with 
whom I came in contact were much more sophisticated they too could be 
awkward and sometimes unnecessarily difficult e.g. in the tough negotiations 
over the status of UN Forces in Japan in connection with the Korean War. At the 
beginning of 1952 I had to spend many long days on these negotiations, which 
were supposed to be completed before the Peace Treaty came into force on 28 
April 1952. Meetings were held in the old Gaimusho, where there was no central 
heating. Often, as I was suffering from sinus trouble, I would sit huddled in my 
overcoat, no doubt much to the disgust of the Japanese officials on the other side 
of the table.   
 
Our agreement was supposed to be based on the Americans own status of 
forces agreement, but the Japanese were unwilling to give us parity, wanting to 
use any agreement reached with us as a lever to get alterations in the American 
agreement. The Americans were supposed to make the running over the UN 
Forces agreement as well but for understandable reasons were unwilling to stick 
their necks out.  
 
The main sticking point was over jurisdiction for offences, which might be 
committed by members of the UN Forces against Japanese. We sought 
extraterritorial rights claiming that, a similar right having been granted to the 
Americans, such offenders should be tried under our laws by our own courts  
 
martial. No compromise was possible and the agreement was only concluded 
when in 1954 the American conceded to the Japanese on this issue. 
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance also pressed hard for a decrease in the 
burden on the Japanese taxpayer. When we urged that they should regard the 
costs as a contribution to the UN effort and pointed out that Japan had frequently 
asserted that ‘Korea was a dagger pointing at the heart of Japan’ they were 
unmoved. They were also unwilling to recognize that they should help UN Forces 
because of the obligations which Japan had accepted under Article 5 a) iii) of the 
Peace Treaty to give the UN ‘every assistance in any action which it takes in 
accordance with the charter.’ 
 
Although these negotiations were very time-consuming and frustrating I learnt a 
lot from them about negotiation and about Japanese officialdom. I had to admire 
their meticulousness and also their command of English.  
 
Japan in those last months before the Peace Treaty came into force was not a 
comfortable place. There was still a great deal of poverty and Japanese 
accommodation generally was of a very low standard. Japanese officials had a 
particularly hard time and it says much for their discipline and restraint that they 
were generally polite and helpful to us foreigners.   
 
Social discontent, if not seething, was not far below the surface and Dening’s 
fears of left-wing extremism were justified by the May Day riots in 1952 soon 
after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty when radicals threw stones at 
foreigners and burnt foreign cars in Hibiya and near the Palace.  
 
Dening and de la Mare were also right to be concerned about corruption and 
neo-nationalism.  The old guard was creeping back into power. 
 
Many of the concerns of those days have long since disappeared. The extreme 
left is no longer a threat to stability in Japan and poverty has been replaced by 
affluence. But Japanese politics would appear to be just as venal as they ever 
were. Japanese still seem ultra-conscious of being Japanese although attitudes 
towards the rest of Asia have matured.    
 
 
Few Japanese today will remember the various articles of the Peace Treaty 
except perhaps the territorial clauses (especially Article 2 c) about renunciation of 
the Kurile islands.  The Japanese, of course, claim that the four southern islands, 
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan, do not constitute a traditional part of 
the ‘Kuriles’.  
 
The Japanese government have stuck to a strictly legal interpretation of Article 
XVI, which deals with compensation for former prisoners of war. A more 
generous interpretation would have been beneficial to Japan’s relations, 





Looking Back: The San Francisco Peace Treaty in the Context of 




The British foreign secretary, Herbert Morrison, was not present for the opening of 
the peace conference in San Francisco: he arrived for the concluding stage including 
the signing of the treaty. It was symbolically appropriate that the foreign secretary 
was absent at the beginning of the conference. It symbolised the extent to which 
Britain’s role in Japan had declined compared to pre-war days and, equally, the 
extent of American domination of the Pacific region. Kenneth Younger, the minister 
of state in the Foreign Office, headed the British delegation until Morrison arrived. 
Early in the conference Younger was visited by Yoshida Shigeru who looked back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century: ‘Yoshida referred with some emotion to the 
long standing tradition of friendship between our two countries, a tradition unhappily 
broken by the war. The Japanese leaders before the war, he said, had gone ‘crazy’ 
and lost common sense and he hoped this would never recur’.
1 Yoshida was 
notorious for looking back to the former days of Anglo-Japanese amity and, in 
particular, to the Anglo-Japanese alliance of his early years. He referred to past 
cooperation and spoke of his desire to rekindle this spirit. Of course, present and 
future calculation entered into this nostalgic retrospect: Yoshida thought that a 
revived British role could modify certain of the brash (or rash) initiatives emanating 
from Washington. British leaders wished to exert more influence over American 
policy but they did not think in terms of recreating the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
When Ian Nish invited me to contribute to this symposium, I thought it would be 
interesting to place the San Francisco treaty in the context of Anglo-Japanese 
relations during the preceding fifty years. This was strengthened when Sir Hugh 
Cortazzi invited me to contribute an essay to a volume he is editing in the series of 
Anglo-Japanese biographical portraits, since the period of this essay extends back to 
the era just before and during the Great War. I would like to begin by looking at the 
principal areas of concern for Great Britain in negotiating a treaty and then to 
consider the repercussions of past Anglo-Japanese relations before returning to San 
Francisco. 
 
The allied occupation of Japan was dominated by the United States or, to be more 
specific, in the early years of the occupation, by General MacArthur.




hopes of playing a significant part in the occupation were dashed: Britain’s 
contribution was limited. The head of the British liaison mission in Tokyo, between 
July 1946 and February 1951, was Sir Alvary Gascoigne and he proved effective in 
communicating British views during his frequent meetings with MacArthur even if he 
had to pay the price of enduring MacArthur’s monologues.
3 MacArthur was later to 
describe Gascoigne as ‘sharp’ and more adroit than Sir Esler Dening.
4 British 
concern in approaching a peace treaty may be defined under the following sub-
headings: economic, strategic and public opinion. Anxiety regarding economic issues 
resulted from the nature of Japanese competition before the Pacific war, 
accentuated by the determination of the Labour government in Britain to restore the 
British economy after 1945. Concern focused on textiles, shipping and the potteries. 
Textile manufacturers and trade unionists were vociferous in reminding the 
government of the threat to Lancashire posed by economic revival in Japan. Sir 
Raymond Streat, a prominent businessman in Manchester and chairman of the 
Cotton Board, worked skilfully to achieve recognition of the problems facing 
Lancashire while concurring that rationalisation and modernisation had to be 
implemented within the mill towns.
5 When Herbert Morrison reached San Francisco, 
he met Yoshida and emphasised that pre-war economic tension should be avoided: 
 
There was anxiety in Great Britain lest pre-war conditions of 
sweated labour and competition were revived. In the interests 
of the people of Japan and of relations between Japan and 
Britain it was essential that this should not happen. Indeed I felt 
that my signing of the Treaty would be justified only if the 
Japanese Government took steps to see that there was no 
recurrence of these conditions.
6 
 
It had been agreed earlier, during exchanges between Streat, the Foreign Office and 
SCAP, that it would not be feasible to deal with textiles in the treaty itself and that a 




The Labour government showed more alarm over shipping. The British view was that 
the Japanese merchant marine should be restricted so as to ensure fair competition 
internationally. In the past shipping had been subsidised and British firms feared that 
the Japanese merchant fleet would pursue discriminatory practices, as had applied 
previously. John Foster Dulles had made clear during his negotiations with the 
British that he would not entertain direct reference to shipbuilding within the treaty.  
 
 
The Foreign Office wanted to reach an understanding with the United States to curb 
Japanese construction but the cabinet was informed by Morrison on 1 August 1951 
that the Truman administration sympathised with Japan rather than Britain. The 
cabinet discussion confirmed more general anxiety over future competition, ranging 
beyond shipbuilding.
8 Since the United States was looking towards Japan pursuing 
an enhanced role in South-East Asia, in addition to assisting American defence aims 
in Eastern Asia and the western pacific, it could not be expected that the pleas of the 
British shipping industry would elicit undue sympathy. 
 
The Staffordshire potteries represented a more localised lobby but one that had 
some importance in that Stoke-on-Trent had two Labour MPs and vocal trade 
unions.
9  However, the British made little headway over economic matters before 
and during Dulles’s visit to London in June 1951. The one concession obtained 
concerned the Congo Basin treaties. Dulles agreed that Japan would forfeit rights 




Strategic issues possessed implications for the Commonwealth of crucial importance 
to Australia and New Zealand. Given the profound damage caused to the Empire 
and Commonwealth by the Japanese offensives in 1941-2, it was very 
understandable that there was determination to avoid a recurrence of a Japanese 
military/naval threat. The approach of the Truman administration was very different. 
Japan was an essential cornerstone in the defence of the ‘Free World’ and Dulles 
favoured significant Japanese rearmament, placed within a framework of 
interconnected defence arrangements. In January 1951 Dulles was pondering 
defence questions. The Attlee cabinet then noted the preference of Australia and 
New Zealand for a restrictive treaty that would minimise the danger of renewed 
Japanese militarism;
11 at this time American thinking was fluid. Dulles soon made 
clear that he was contemplating regional defence arrangements from which Britain 
would be excluded. This created resentment, although the Labour government 
eventually acquiesced. However, the leader of the opposition, Winston Churchill, 
was outraged at British exclusion from ANZUS and he engaged in a futile bid to 
reverse the American decision when he returned to office in October 1951. The 
Korean war and various communist rebellions within South-East Asia stimulated the 
British desire for a new defence structure and this materialised eventually in the 
creation of SEATO in 1954-5.
12 Officials in the Foreign Office were doubtful at the  
 
 
likely success of the reforms implemented during the occupation of Japan in the 
medium to long term: Japanese politics could veer either to the right or left. While the 
potential of communism succeeding could not be ignored, it was more probable that 
Japan would move to the right. Members of the Attlee cabinet were not happy about 
Japanese rearmament and they were less reconciled than the civil servants to this 
trend continuing. At the time of the San Francisco conference, British leaders could 
but hope that the strategy devised by Dulles would prove effective. 
 
The issue of compensation for POWs is, as we know only too well, fraught with deep 
controversy. The matter was mishandled in 1951 and subsequently. The allied 
governments should have ensured more generous financial recompense and the 
Japanese government should have shown more awareness of the strength of feeling 
over wartime atrocities. Members of the cabinet sometimes referred to the powerful 
emotions felt in Britain over POWs during their deliberations in 1951.
13 The 
compensation paid after the signing of the treaty was wholly inadequate. It was not 
until the 1990s that the Japanese and British governments demonstrated greater 
appreciation of the problem by which time the majority of those affected were dead. 
Awareness of the sufferings of POWs in part explained the Labour government’s 
reaction over Japanese gold holdings and a war guilt clause. Hugh Gaitskell, the 
chancellor of the exchequer and next leader of the Labour party, held fervently that 
Japanese gold deposits should be retained. He observed that West Germany had 
been compelled to surrender gold holdings in addition to making larger reparations 
payments.
14  When Gaitskell met Dulles in June 1951, he argued that Japan did not 
deserve to be treated generously and alluded to hostility to Japan in Britain arising 
from the sufferings of POWs.
15 Dulles replied that the Japanese economy could not 
be crippled through excessively harsh retribution and that Japanese gold deposits 
should be regarded as a reserve when the occupation ended. Neither Gaitskell nor 
Dulles gave ground in their exchanges but Dulles was in a position to ensure that 
American preferences prevailed. Dulles was also adamant over the question of a war 
guilt clause. He had attended the Paris peace conference in 1919 and the bitter 
disputes concerning the Treaty of Versailles convinced him that war guilt clauses 
served no useful purpose. Officials in Whitehall tended to agree but some cabinet 
ministers still inclined towards including such a clause. Once again Dulles’s will 





I shall now go back to the early twentieth century but using spectacles rather less 
rose tinted than those worn by Yoshida in the quotation with which I began. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance lasted for twenty-one years (1902-23). What did each 
signatory gain from it? Britain benefited from the blocking of Russian expansion in 
the war of 1904-5. The alliance permitted Britain to concentrate the Royal Navy 
closer to home during the Anglo-German naval race. Both Sir Edward Grey and 
Winston Churchill, foreign secretary and first lord of the Admiralty respectively, 
emphasised how essential the alliance was between 1911 and 1914.
16  This was 
proved between 1914 and 1918 when the Imperial Japanese Navy assisted in 
capturing German possessions and in defeating German raiders in addition to 
sending a squadron to the Mediterranean. The alliance acted as a partial brake on 
Japanese expansion in China, although this diminished during the Great War. Japan 
gained from possessing an alliance with the largest empire in the world. Japan 
expanded significantly but without advancing its interests in China as far as it would 
have wished. F.R. Dickinson, in his recent study of Japan during the Great War, has 
underlined the stimulus given to ‘reinvention’ through participation in war.
17 Japanese 
leaders diverged in their attitudes towards Britain. The genro, notably Yamagata 
Aritomo, wanted a less exclusive relationship with Britain and wished to encourage 
closer relations with Russia and France. Some in the army and in the universities 
mused on switching partners and backing Germany instead of Britain. The entry of 
the United States into the war in 1917, plus the two revolutions in Russia in 1917, 
complicated matters greatly. Wilsonian liberalism was not relished by conservative 
Japanese leaders while the army and the navy warily observed the rapid growth in 
American naval power.  
 
Developments in China caused growing friction following the revolution of 1911-12 
which terminated the empire and ushered in a republic. Most Japanese, whatever 
their political opinions or loyalties, wished to expand Japanese political, economic 
and strategic interests in China. Dickinson points out that Kato Takaaki, a 
courageous and tenacious advocate of developing party politics, took the initiative 
dramatically in 1914-15 in endeavouring to expand Japan’s role in a manner that 
Dickinson describes as a continuation in traditional European imperialism of the 
nineteenth century.
18 I am not persuaded by his arguments over Kato but I shall not 
pursue this further in this paper. British suspicion of Japanese policy in China 




in the Yangtze valley, which had accumulated since the opening up of China. While 
there were phases when Britain and Japan collaborated against Chinese nationalism 
during the 1920s, fundamentally the former allies diverged sharply. This was starkly 
evident during the Manchurian crisis when Japanese forces became involved in 
serious fighting in Shanghai in 1932. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 
1937 led to problems of such gravity as to threaten war between Britain and Japan in 
the summer of 1939.
19 
 
Japanese espousal of Pan-Asianism accentuated tension during the 1930s and this 
was a continuation of suspicion dating back to links between Indian dissidents and 
Pan-Asian nationalist societies in Japan before 1914. The Japanese decision to 
attack the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies in December 1941 
marked a point where, as Yoshida had remarked, Japanese leaders had gone ‘crazy’ 
in their attempt to liquidate western interests in Eastern Asia and the western Pacific. 
Responses in Britain, Australia and New Zealand after 1945 were governed by the 
trauma experienced in 1941-2. The course of Anglo-American exchanges in 
negotiating a peace treaty revealed contrasting approaches of some interest. Why 
should the United States be distinctly more magnanimous than Britain? Reactions in 
sections of American public opinion to the 50
th anniversary of the outbreak and 
termination of the Pacific war, in 1991 and 1995, showed that animosity towards 
Japan was still present, as illustrated in the dispute over the exhibition in the 
Smithsonian. American opinion was not conspicuously critical in 1951, however. 
Several factors explain this situation. The United States had been principally 
responsible for the functioning of the allied occupation and this connoted heavy 
responsibility; the development of the Cold War in Asia in 1948-9 and the eruption of 
a localised ‘hot war’ in Korea meant that retribution gave way to realisation that 
Japan must be treated generously in order to accomplish wider American aims. 
General MacArthur and John Foster Dulles each advocated leniency. Thus it could 
be said that the Truman administration, MacArthur and Dulles were looking forward 
where Japan was concerned. 
 
However, Britain was looking back. The fact that the Attlee government did not bear 
particular responsibility for the running of the occupation encouraged a more critical 
and less positive reaction. Officials in the Foreign Office were sceptical of the 
political reforms, and certain of the economic and social changes, introduced by 





20 The occupation had lasted for too long, certainly longer than Britain had 
desired or MacArthur professed to desire. Dening’s deduction was that the 
occupation should be ended because Japan would be more difficult to deal with if 
this did not occur – ‘keeping Japan in quarantine presents to my mind far greater 
dangers’.
21 Labour ministers often uttered more critical opinions when the cabinet 
reviewed progress during the treaty negotiations in 1951. Gaitskell was the most 
critical. It is clear that the cabinet was looking back and resented Japan’s 
contribution to British decline and the problems they were to contend with, for 
example in seeking to regalvanise the economy which could be jeopardised through 
the revival in Japanese competition. 
 
As we have seen, China was very important in accentuating the strains within Anglo-
Japanese relations between 1911 and 1941. Ironically China again presented 
difficulties during the treaty negotiations and indeed into the proceedings in San 
Francisco. This resulted from the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party during the 
civil war in China. On 1 October 1949 Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Three months later Britain recognised the 
PRC. The British argument for so doing, as advanced by the prime minister, Clement 
Attlee, and the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, was that the outgoing Kuomintang 
regime, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had been defeated comprehensively and was likely 
to be cast into the dustbin of history later in 1950 when Taiwan fell to subversion or 
attack from the mainland.
22 Attlee and Bevin also wished to keep in step with India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon who favoured recognition; to protect Hong Kong; and to revive 
British trade in China. They argued further that recognition of the PRC could seduce 
China away from the embrace of the Soviet Union. Dean Acheson, the American 
secretary of state, was attracted by the latter argument but the strength of anti-
communism in the United States, fuelled by unscrupulous Republican censure of 
Truman and Acheson for permitting the ‘loss’ of  China to occur, rendered it 
impossible for the Truman administration to recognise the PRC. Chiang Kai-shek’s 
moribund regime was based in Taiwan. American strategists came to regard Taiwan 
as vital to American defence in 1949-50. MacArthur strongly urged denying Taiwan 
to the PRC. Acheson adopted the same view in May-June 1950, not because he 
wished to continue propping up the Kuomintang but because he believed that 
Taiwan could be denied to the PRC without necessarily entailing support for Chiang. 




conflict in October-November 1950, created a far more hazardous situation. While 
Chinese forces were fighting UN forces, no thought could be given to rapprochement 




Disagreement between Britain and the United States over China was exacerbated by 
criticism of trade with China via Hong Kong expressed by American politicians, 
especially those associated with the right wing of the Republican party: prominent in 
this faction were Senators Robert A. Taft, William Knowland, Richard Nixon and 
Joseph McCarthy, to which should be added the name of General MacArthur who 
had been dismissed by President Truman in April 1951. The Truman administration 
pressed for tougher economic sanctions against China.
24 Dulles was arguably ideally 
placed to handle the dilemma of China within the context of the peace treaty. He was 
a Republican and maintained regular contact with both wings of the party: thus he 
could allay suspicion more readily than would have been the case had a Democrat 
conducted the negotiations. Dulles revealed great dexterity in pursuing talks with the 
British, SCAP, Japanese and with the Australian and New Zealand governments. 
One trump card Dulles could play when the occasion demanded was to remind 
whoever was being obdurate that the peace treaty would not only have to be signed 
but also ratified by the U.S. Senate. The latter step was not to be taken for granted, 
given the record of independence displayed by the Senate over many years. Dulles 
exaggerated the danger for his own reasons but the danger existed. 
 
The Labour government favoured the participation of the PRC in the peace 
conference but appreciated that this could not be accepted by the Truman 
administration. Herbert Morrison approved a proposal emanating from the Canadian 
government that the peace treaty should provide for eventual Chinese adhesion but 
that a Chinese signature should be postponed until a more appropriate time. The 
Labour cabinet did not wish to be associated with a treaty signed by the Kuomintang 
regime, although Dulles suggested at one point that both Chinese governments 
could sign.
25 Dulles reminded the British during his talks in London in June 1951 that 
he was concerned at the emotional state of American public opinion over China – 
‘He was above all anxious to keep the Japanese Peace Treaty free from 
entanglement with the Chinese problem’.
26  Dulles angled for the Japanese 
government to have the freedom to decide subsequently which Chinese regime to 




left nominally free to make her own arrangements with China, she would be more 
likely, while under United States tutelage, to enter into relations with the Chinese 
Nationalist Government’.
27 At the end of Dulles’s discussions in June, it was agreed 
that neither of the rival Chinese governments would be invited to sign and that the 
peace treaty would permit Japan to conclude a bilateral treaty on similar terms to 
that contained in the peace treaty. This was the best attainable solution in the 
circumstances but Dulles had secured the freedom to manoeuvre the Japanese 
government into recognising Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. Morrison and his 
Conservative successor, Anthony Eden, were irate when this turned out to be the 
case but it should have occasioned no surprise and it was not worth the ill-tempered 
exchanges that occurred later in 1951. 
 
For Great Britain the Japanese attack in December 1941, leading to the surrender of 
Singapore on 15 February 1942, was a devastating blow to the Empire, 
Commonwealth and British prestige. The fall of Singapore was a milestone in British 
decline. For the United States the attack on Pearl Harbor was a grave and 
humiliating episode but it was a potent spur to the growth of American power, not an 
indication of decline. Vigorous resilience characterised the American reaction to war 
and the occupation of Japan. Britain had advocated an early peace treaty for a 
lengthy period, wavering only briefly in March 1951 when the inexperienced Morrison 
agreed that negotiations should be halted temporarily. British officials contributed 
positively to the final drafting of the treaty. Herbert Morrison believed that more open 
recognition should be given to the British contribution (and the contribution of Herbert 
Morrison). On his instructions a telegram was sent to Washington on 7 August 1951 
reading in part: 
 
We do not wish to advertise the influence we have exerted 
behind the scenes but in the circumstances … we think that  
excessive modesty about  our contributions would be against 
the interests of His Majesty’s Government and of Anglo-United 
States cooperation generally. It seems to us that it would also 
be to the United States Government’s own advantage in their 
relations with the other Governments concerned to avoid letting 




It was all the more ironic that Morrison  originally indicated that he would not even 
attend the San Francisco conference because he had booked a holiday before the 




attend for the closing stages. The British approach to the peace treaty was based 
largely on past British experiences economically, strategically and in dealing with 
POWs. British politicians and officials were looking back, the politicians engaging in 
this to a greater degree than the officials but the latter also looked back. The 
Americans looked ahead and did not dwell too much on the negative side of Pearl 
Harbor. As George Bush, Sr, put it, on the 50
th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, I 
paraphrase, ‘We won, we beat them, what have we to worry about?’. The British 
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